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THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT IN BEN-SHALOM V.
MARSH: EQUATING SPEECH WITH
CONDUCT
I. INTRODUCTION
Sergeant Miriam Ben-Shalom of the United States Army Reserve
said she was a lesbian.1 As a result, the United States Army (the Army)
discharged her.2 The Army offered no evidence that Ben-Shalom had
ever engaged in homosexual conduct; rather, it justified Ben-Shalom's
discharge on the basis of her lesbian status, as revealed by her statements
alone.' Ben-Shalom sued for wrongful discharge.4 The district court, in
granting her motion for summary judgment,5 held that the Army had
violated Ben-Shalom's constitutional rights to free speech,6 privacy7 and
1. benShalom v. Secretary of Army (Ben-Shalom I), 489 F. Supp. 964, 969 (E.D. Wis.
1980), aff'd on other grounds, 826 F.2d 722 (7th Cir. 1987). It should be noted that the courts
have not spelled Ben-Shalom's name consistently.
As used in this Note, "lesbians" are homosexual women and "gays" or "gay men" are
homosexual men. A "homosexual person" is an individual of either gender who acknowl-
edges, at least internally, that his or her sexual orientation is almost exclusively directed to-
wards persons of the same sex. Conversely, a "heterosexual person" is an individual of either
gender who acknowledges that his or her sexual orientation is directed almost exclusively to-
wards persons of the opposite sex.
For purposes of this Note, the terms "homosexual conduct" or "homosexual acts" denote
same-sex sexual activity regardless of the sexual orientation of the participants. "Heterosexual
conduct" or "heterosexual acts" refer to sexual activity between persons of the opposite sex,
regardless of their sexual orientation.
The issue of whether private, sexual conduct between consenting adults should be punish-
able, either by military or civilian authorities, is beyond the scope of this Note. For a discus-
sion of the negative impact on social morality caused when law is used to enforce a particular
moral attitude toward private, consensual sexual conduct, see generally H.L.A. HART, LAW,
LIBERTY, AND MORALITY (1963).
2. Ben-Shalom 1, 489 F. Supp. at 969.
3. Id.
4. Id
5. Id. at 977.
6. Id. at 974-75; U.S. CONST. amend. I.
7. Ben-Shalom I, 489 F. Supp. at 976; U.S. CONST. amends. I, IX. Distinguishing sexual
preference from sexual conduct, the court found that the Army had abridged Ben-Shalom's
privacy interests by intruding upon her autonomous control over her personality as protected
by the ninth amendment, and by restricting manifestations of her personality as protected by
the first amendment. Ben-Shalom 1, 489 F. Supp. at 975-76.
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:421
substantive due process' and ordered the Army to reinstate her.9
After completing her initial term of enlistment, Ben-Shalom decided
to reenlist. 10 The Army rejected her application." Again, the Army
based its action on Ben-Shalom's verbal acknowledgment of her lesbian
orientation and did not allege that she had committed any homosexual
acts.'2 This time, the district court concluded that the Army had vio-
* lated Ben-Shalom's constitutional rights to free speech and equal protec-
tion under the first and fifth amendments, respectively. 3 On appeal,
however, a three-judge panel of the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding
that it was not unconstitutional to deny Ben-Shalom's reenlistment on
the basis of her statements alone. 4
This Note criticizes the reasoning of the Seventh Circuit panel in
Ben-Shalom v. Marsh (Ben-Shalom 11).11 By refusing to distinguish sex-
ual orientation from sexual behavior and, thus, to distinguish speech
from conduct,' 6 the panel failed to address issues central to a determina-
tion of whether the Army had violated Ben-Shalom's first and fifth
amendment rights."' Moreover, the panel's reasoning was limited by its
assumption that traditional judicial deference to the military required au-
tomatic acceptance of the Army's justifications for excluding homosexual
8. Ben-Shalom I, 489 F. Supp. at 976-77; U.S. CONsT. amend. V. The phrase "substan-
tive due process" encompasses those enumerated or implied rights in The Bill of Rights to the
United States Constitution that the United States Supreme Court, in defining the "liberty"
interests protected by the fifth and fourteenth amendments, U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV, § 1,
has identified as fundamental to a free human being. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW §§ 11-2, 15-3 (2d ed. 1988).
9. Ben-Shalom I, 489 F. Supp. at 977.
10. Ben-Shalom v. Marsh (Ben-Shalom II), 881 F.2d 454,457 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
110 S. Ct. 1296 (1990).
11. Id.
12. Id
13. BenShalom v. Marsh, 703 F. Supp. 1372, 1377, 1380 (E.D. Wis.) (granting Ben-Sha-
lom's motion for summary judgment), rev'd, 881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S.
Ct. 1296 (1990).
14. Ben-Shalom II, 881 F.2d at 462, 464, 466.
15. 881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989), cerL denied, 110 S. Ct. 1296 (1990).
16. See id. at 460, 462, 464.
17. For example, with respect to the first amendment, the panel never inquired whether
verbal self-identifications of homosexuality might be political speech worthy of the highest
protection. See infra notes 231-40 and accompanying text. Similarly, the panel failed to dis-
cuss the impact of the Army's regulation on freedom of thought. See infra notes 241-49 and
accompanying text. The panel also did not discuss whether acknowledgments of homosexual
orientation might be manifestations of personality protected by the inherent first amendment
right to privacy. See infra notes 250-57 and accompanying text.
The panel's fifth amendment equal protection analysis was similarly marred by the confla-
tion of speech with conduct. See infra notes 307-36 and accompanying text.
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individuals. 8
This Note presents a brief overview of recent legal events pertaining
to the military's antihomosexual policy. It then sets forth the facts of
Ben-Shalom 11 and the appellate panel's reasoning. The analysis focuses
on first amendment issues and discusses judicial deference and equal pro-
tection in that context. Finally, the author concludes that the Seventh
Circuit panel's holding not only abridges the first and fifth amendment




The military's policy of excluding gays and lesbians originated dur-
ing World War I.19 Before that time, the military had focused on homo-
sexual conduct rather than homosexual personalities.20 Any individual,
regardless of sexual orientation, who committed an act of homosexual
sodomy was subject to imprisonment pursuant to court martial.21 Dur-
18. See Ben-Shalom II, 881 F.2d at 460-61, 466. See infra notes 258-306 and accompany-
ing text for a discussion of the panel's overly expansive interpretation of the deference due to
assertions of military necessity.
19. A. BERUBE, COMING OUT UNDER FIRE: THE HISTORY OF GAY MEN AND WOMEN
IN WORLD WAR TWO 2, 33 (1990).
20. Id. But see Chauncey, Christian Brotherhood or Sexual Perversion? Homosexual Iden-
tities and the Construction of Sexual Boundaries in the World War One Era, 19 J. Soc. HIST.
189, 197 (1985) ("The fact that naval and civilian authorities could prosecute men only for the
commission of specific acts of sodomy should not be construed to mean that they viewed ho-
mosexuality simply as an act rather than as a condition characteristic of certain individuals
21. A. BERUBE, supra note 19, at 2, 33. Court martials for homosexual sodomy may still
be initiated pursuant to the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-941
(1988).
Article 125 of the UCMJ proscribes sodomy which it defines as "unnatural carnal copula-
tion with another person of the same or opposite sex or with an animal." Id. § 925(a) (empha-
sis added). Both cunnilingus and fellatio have been held to be sodomy as defined by article
125. United States v. Harris, 8 M.J. 52, 58 (C.M.A. 1979) (cunnilingus); United States v.
Scoby, 5 M.J. 160, 166 (C.M.A. 1978) (fellatio). Article 80 punishes attempts to commit sod-
omy. See 10 U.S.C. § 880.
The other UCMJ articles that are used in court martials for homosexual or heterosexual
acts are less specific about the acts prohibited. Article 133 provides for court martial of per-
sons engaging in "conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman." Id. § 933. Article 134
authorizes court martial for "all disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good order and
discipline." Id. § 934. Pursuant to the Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1984, arti-
cle 134 includes crimes of "indecency." Exec. Order No. 12,474, 49 Fed. Reg. 17,154, 17,409
(1984). With respect to acts, "indecency" is defined as "that form of immorality relating to
sexual impurity which is not only grossly vulgar, obscene, and repugnant to common propri-
ety, but tends to excite lust and deprave the morals with respect to sexual relations." Id.
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ing World War II, the military's focus changed due to its reliance on
psychiatrists in developing military personnel policies.22 Under the influ-
ence of the then-current psychiatric theory that homosexuality was a
mental disorder,23 the military switched from a court martial procedure
to an administrative discharge procedure for known, or suspected, homo-
sexual personnel.24 Although court martial remained a threat for those
who refused to cooperate and accept their dishonorable discharges,2" the
military limited use of the court martial to cases involving coerced or
adult-minor sexual encounters.2 6
According to Professor Rhonda Rivera,27 before 1973, civilian court
challenges to military court martial and administrative discharge pro-
ceedings involving homosexual personnel generally focused on questions
of guilt or innocence or on procedural issues.28 In 1973, however, gays
and lesbians began using the civilian courts to raise constitutional chal-
lenges to the military's antihomosexual policy.29 For awhile, it seemed
that the courts would insist that the military show a connection between
homosexuality and job performance in order to justify discharges of ho-
Indecency may also take the form of offensive language that has a "tendency to incite lustful
thought." Id.
22. A. BERUBE, supra note 19, at 2, 33.
23. Id. at 13. The American Psychiatric Association (the Association) finally removed
homosexuality from its list of mental disorders in 1974. Defense Personnel Security Research
and Education Center (PERSEREC), Non-Conforming Sexual Orientations and Military Suit-
ability (Dec. 1988), reprinted in GAYS IN UNIFORM 5, 22 (K. Dyer ed. 1990) [hereinafter
PERSEREC Report]. In reaching this decision, the Association may have been motivated by
political considerations rather than scientific findings, even though, as early as 1957, scientific
research justified the conclusion that homosexuality is not a mental illness. Id. at 22-23.
24. A. BERUBE, supra note 19, at 136-37, 143-44.
25. Until the 1970's, military personnel automatically received dishonorable discharges for
homosexuality. Rivera, Queer Law: Sexual Orientation in the Mid-Eighties, Part II, 11 DAY-
TON L. REv. 275, 299 (1986). Some homosexual individuals, however, escaped this stigma
and obtained honorable discharges by convincing military psychiatrists to diagnose them as
psychoneurotics. A. BERUBE, supra note 19, at 202.
26. A. BERUBE, supra note 19, at 137, 144.
27. In 1979, Professor Rhonda Rivera began a series of articles which present a compre-
hensive review of the legal situation of homosexual persons throughout the United States.
Rivera, supra note 25, at 275 n.1.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 288 n.88 (noting constitutional challenges of Champagne v. Schlesinger, 506
F.2d 979 (7th Cir. 1974); benShalom v. Secretary of Army (Ben-Shalom 1), 489 F. Supp. 964
(E.D. Wis. 1980), aff'd on other grounds, 826 F.2d 722 (7th Cir. 1987); Berg v. Claytor, 436 F.
Supp. 76 (D.D.C. 1977), vacated, 591 F.2d 849 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Saal v. Middendorf, 427 F.
Supp. 192 (N.D. Cal. 1977), rev'd sub nom. Belier v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 905, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 855 (1981); Matlovich v. Secretary of
the Air Force, 414 F. Supp. 690 (D.D.C. 1976), vacated, 591 F.2d 852 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Doe v.
Chaffee, 355 F. Supp. 112 (N.D. Cal. 1973)).
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mosexual individuals.30 This trend culminated in 1980 with Ben-Sha-
lom's successful challenge to the Army's attempt to discharge her during
her initial enlistment period.3
Professor Rivera has isolated four events which reversed this trend
toward requiring the military to show some reasonable link between in-
service performance and homosexuality.32 First, the Ninth Circuit up-
held the Navy's discharge of two gay men and one lesbian on the ground
that the special nature of the military required the court to give great
deference to the Navy's reasons for excluding homosexual personnel.33
Second, as a result of this decision, two other gay servicemen, who had
successfully appealed summary judgments granted to the Air Force and
Navy, accepted out-of-court monetary settlements in lieu of pursuing
their wrongful discharge claims. 34 Third, the Department of Defense
(DoD) rewrote its directives in order to close regulatory loopholes which
had allowed known homosexual servicepersons to remain in the military
under certain circumstances.35 Fourth, for almost seven years, the Army
30. Rivera, supra note 25, at 289.
31. Id. at 291.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 291-95; see Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788, 812 (9th Cir. 1980), cerL denied,
452 U.S. 905, cert denied, 454 U.S. 855 (1981).
The military has explained its belief that homosexuality would interfere with its goals as
follows:
Homosexuality is incompatible with military service. The presence in the military
environment of persons who engage in homosexual conduct or who, by their state-
ments, demonstrate a propensity to engage in homosexual conduct, seriously impairs
the accomplishment of the military mission. The presence of such members ad-
versely affects the ability of the Military Services [1] to maintain discipline, good
order, and morale; [2] to foster mutual trust and confidence among servicemembers;
[3] to ensure the integrity of the system of rank and command; [4] to facilitate assign-
ment and worldwide deployment of servicemembers who frequently must live and
work under close conditions affording minimal privacy; [5] to recruit and retain
members of the Military Services; [6] to maintain the public acceptability of military
service; and [7] to prevent breaches of military security.
32 C.F.R. pt. 41 app. A, pt. l(H)(1)(a) (1989).
34. Rivera, supra note 25, at 291, 295 (discussing plaintiffs' decisions to forego remands
granted in Matlovich v. Secretary of the Air Force, 591 F.2d 852, 861 (D.C. Cir. 1978) and
Berg v. Claytor, 591 F.2d 849, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1978)).
35. Id. at 291, 298. Matlovich v. Secretary of the Air Force and Berg v. Claytor revealed
that, because exclusion of homosexual personnel was discretionary under Air Force and Navy
regulations, both services would have to specify their reasons when opting to discharge a ho-
mosexual person so that the reviewing court could determine the legitimacy of the dismissal.
See Matlovich v. Secretary of the Air Force, 591 F.2d 852, 857 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Berg v.
Claytor 591 F.2d 849, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1978). Ben-Shalom I showed that the Army's regulation
requiring discharge of those who evidenced a homosexual "tendency, desire or interest" was
too broad to pass constitutional muster. See Ben-Shalom I, 489 F. Supp. at 974.
Thus, the rewritten DoD directives mandated discharge of homosexual individuals and
narrowed the definition of a homosexual person to include only someone "who engages in,
desires to engage in, or intends to engage in homosexual acts." Dept. Def. Directive No.
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was able to forestall compliance with the district court's order to rein-
state Ben-Shalom for the remainder of her initial enlistment term. 6
These events marked the end of a period of progress toward gay and
lesbian rights in the armed forces.37
B.. The Legal Significance of Distinguishing Homosexual Orientation
from Homosexual Conduct
In 1986, another event occurred that significantly influenced cases
concerning homosexual servicepersons, even though it did not involve
the military: The United States Supreme Court decided Bowers v. Hard-
wick.38 In Hardwick, the Court reviewed a Georgia statute criminalizing
1332.14 end. 3, pt. l(H)(l)(b)(1) (1982) (Enlisted Administrative Separations) (current version
at 32 C.F.R. pt. 41 app. A, pt. 1(-)(1)(b)(1) (1989)); accord Dept. Def. Directive No. 1332.30
encl. 1(7), encl. 2, (B)(4) (1986) (Separation of Regular Commissioned Officers for Cause).
Furthermore, a presumption of homosexuality could be rebutted only if all five of the
following findings were made with respect to preservice, prior service or current service con-
duct or statements:
(a) Such conduct is a departure from the member's usual and customary behavior;
(b) Such conduct under all the circumstances is unlikely to recur;
(c) Such conduct was not accomplished by use of force, coercion, or intimidation
by the member during a period of military service;
(d) Under the particular circumstances of the case, the member's continued pres-
ence in the Service is consistent with the interest of the Service in proper discipline,
good order, and morale; and
(e) The member does not desire to engage in or intend to engage in homosexual
acts.
32 C.F.R. pt. 41 app. A, pt. 1(H)(1)(c)(1). Because this directive excluded persons on the basis
of homosexual "desires," see id. pt. l(H)(1)(b)(1), requiring satisfaction of these five factors to
rebut a presumption of homosexuality meant that persons who made statements acknowledg-
ing their homosexual orientation would always be disqualified from military service. See id. pt.
I(H)(I)(C)(1).
DoD directives governing separation for homosexuality of enlisted personnel and com-
missioned officers are the same in all essential respects. Compare id. pt. l(H)(l)(b)-(c) with
Dept. Def. Directive No. 1332.30 enl. 1(7), end. 2(B)(4). Each branch of the military
promulgates its own regulations to implement these directives. 32 C.F.R. § 41.4 (1989); Dept.
Def. Directive No. 1332.30. Army Regulation (AR) 135-178 1 10 (1989) (governing dis-
charge) and AR 140-111, table 4-2, rule E (1989) (governing reenlistment) are the Army's
implementing regulations.
36. Ben-Shalom v. Marsh (Ben-Shalom I), 881 F.2d 454, 456-57 (7th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 1296 (1990); see Rivera, supra note 25, at 291.
37. See Rivera, supra note 25, at 303-24 (discussing subsequent cases involving homosex-
ual military personnel).
38. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). Pursuant to a Georgia antisodomy statute, Hardwick was ar-
rested in the privacy of his bedroom while engaging in a consensual act of homosexual sod-
omy. Id. at 187-88. The District Attorney did not pursue the matter further than the
preliminary hearing stage and Hardwick was, therefore, never indicted. Id. at 188. Neverthe-
less, Hardwick decided to challenge the constitutionality of the statute and initiated suit. Id.
Although the Georgia statute on its face applied to both heterosexual and homosexual sod-
omy, Georgia's exclusive focus on the statute's value as a tool for prosecuting homosexual
people suggested discriminatory enforcement. Id. at 202 n.2 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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both heterosexual and homosexual consensual sodomy.3 9 The Court
held that the statute, as applied to homosexual sodomy, did not violate
substantive due process because the fundamental right of privacy' did
not extend to consensual acts of homosexual sodomy.4 '
Post-Hardwick gay and lesbian challenges to antihomosexual laws
have focused on two issues not addressed in Hardwick: equal protection,
provided by the fifth and fourteenth amendments, z and freedom of
speech, guaranteed by the first amendment.4 3 Yet, Hardwick had a ma-
jor impact on these challenges, as Ben-Shalom's pre- and post-Hardwick
suits illustrate.'
Hardwick's most significant effect was on the issue of whether gays
and lesbians can ever constitute a "suspect" or "quasi-suspect" class for
39. Id. at 188.
40. The fifth amendment explicitly bars the federal government from depriving an individ-
ual of "life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The
fourteenth amendment imposes an identical proscription on the states. Compare U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § I with U.S. CONsT. amend. V. See supra note 8 for a definition of substantive
due process.
41. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 191-92, 196. The Court based its holding solely on the due
process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. Id. at 191. As the Court specifically
noted, it did not address the issue of equal protection because Hardwick had not challenged
the statute on that basis. Id. at 191 n.8. The Court also reserved the question of whether the
Georgia statute would be constitutional if applied to heterosexual sodomy. Id. at 188 n.2.
42. E.g., Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592 (1988) (equal protection, right to privacy, and due
process liberty and property interest claims by Central Intelligence Agency employee); Wat-
kins v. United States Army, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989) (equal protection challenge to Army
discharge of gay sergeant), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 384 (1990); Woodward v. United States, 871
F.2d 1068 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (equal protection and right to privacy challenges by homosexual
Navy officer), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1295 (1990); Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (equal protection challenge to FBI refusal to hire lesbian); Doe v. Sparks, 733 F. Supp.
227 (W.D. Pa. 1990) (equal protection challenge to county prison rules denying visitation to
boyfriends or girlfriends of homosexual, but not heterosexual, inmates). Unlike the first sec-
tion of the fourteenth amendment, which is addressed only to the states, the fifth amendment
does not contain an equal protection clause. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I with U.S.
CONST. amend. V. Nevertheless, the federal government is bound to the concept of equal
protection through the fifth amendment's due process clause. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497,
499 (1954). The treatment of equal protection claims is essentially the same under both
amendments. Weinberger v. Weisenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975).
43. E.g., High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563 (9th Cir.
1990) (first amendment and equal protection challenges to DoD regulations subjecting all gays
and lesbians to expanded security investigations); Ben-Shalom v. Marsh (Ben-Shalom II), 881
F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989) (free speech and equal protection challenges to Army refusal to reen-
list lesbian), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1296 (1990); Pruitt v. Weinberger, 659 F. Supp. 625 (C.D.
Cal. 1987) (first amendment challenge to Army discharge of lesbian chaplain), appealfiled,
No. 87-5914 (9th Cir. May 5, 1987).
44. Compare Ben-Shalom II, 881 F.2d at 462, 464 (no first amendment or equal protection
violations) with benShalom v. Secretary of the Army (Ben-Shalom I), 489 F. Supp. 964, 976
(E.D. Wis. 1980) (first amendment and substantive due process violations), aff'd on other
grounds, 826 F.2d 722 (7th Cir. 1987).
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purposes of equal protection. 45 The Hardwick Court held it was permis-
sible for states to criminalize homosexual sodomy," conduct popularly
identified as defining homosexuals.47 Therefore, some courts have rea-
soned that homosexuals can never constitute a suspect or quasi-suspect
class because homosexuals are defined by behavior which may be
criminalized.48 This reasoning has been applied even in cases in which
the issue involved homosexual status, rather than conduct.49 Other
courts, however, limiting Hardwick to its facts, have concluded that
Hardwick does not support an inference that laws directed at homosexu-
als solely on the basis of their sexual orientation also would be
constitutional. 0
45. See, eg., Padula, 822 F.2d at 103. "Suspect" or "quasi-suspect" classes are those
groups of persons who historically have been victims of discrimination, who "exhibit obvious,
immutable, or distinguishing characteristics that define them as a discrete group," and who are
"a minority or politically powerless." Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638 (1986). Once the
Court has identified a group as suspect or quasi-suspect, legislation authorizing differential
treatment of that group is subject to heightened judicial scrutiny. See Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440-41 (1985); Castillo, 477 U.S. at 638.
46. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 196.
47. Ben-Shalom II, 881 F.2d at 464-65; Woodward, 871 F.2d at 1075-76; Padula, 822
F.2d at 103-04; see Halley, The Politics of the Closet: Towards Equal Protection for Gay, Les-
bian, and Bisexual Identity, 36 UCLA L. REv. 915, 919-20 (1989). For a discussion on why it
is false to assume that acts of homosexual sodomy define homosexually oriented individuals,
see infra notes 105-16.
48. See, eg., High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 571; Ben-Shalom II, 881 F.2d at 464-65; Wood-
ward, 871 F.2d at 1075-76; Padula, 822 F.2d at 103-04. Contra Watkins, 875 F.2d at 716
(Norris, J., concurring); cf. L. TRIBE, supra note 8, § 15-21, at 1431 & nn.70-71 (on its face,
Georgia statute did not distinguish between heterosexual and homosexual acts of sodomy;
because Hardwick's challenge to statute was "facial," not "as applied" Court mischaracterized
issue by framing it as "'a fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy.'" (quoting
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986))).
49. See, ag., Ben-Shalom II, 881 F.2d at 464-65 ("If homosexual conduct may constitu-
tionally be criminalized, then homosexuals do not constitute a suspect or quasi-suspect class
entitled to greater than rational basis scrutiny ... ."); Woodward, 871 F.2d at 1076 ("After
Hardwick it cannot logically be asserted that discrimination against homosexuals is constitu-
tionally infirm."); Padula, 822 F.2d at 103 ("It would be quite anomolous [sic] ... to declare
status defined by conduct that states may constitutionally criminalize as deserving of strict
scrutiny under the equal protection clause.").
50. Watkins, 875 F.2d at 719 (Norris, J., concurring) ("Whether homosexual conduct is
protected by the due process clause is an entirely separate question from whether the equal
protection clause prohibits discrimination against homosexuals."); Doe v. Casey, 796 F.2d
1508, 1522 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ("[The Supreme Court in Hardwick] did not reach the difficult
issue of whether an agency of the federal government can discriminate against individuals
merely because of sexual orientation."), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds sub
nom. Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592 (1988); BenShalom v. Marsh, 703 F. Supp. 1372, 1379
(E.D. Wis.) ("Hardwick can only be reasonably construed as standing for the proposition that
classifications are not subject to strict scrutiny when defined by homosexual conduct that rises
to the level of criminal sodomy."), rev'd, 881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct.
1296 (1990); High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 668 F. Supp. 1361,
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In the context of the first amendment, Hardwick's impact has been
indirect. Even before Hardwick, the distinction between sexual orienta-
tion and sexual conduct played a role in first amendment challenges to
antihomosexual military regulations"1 because the first amendment pro-
tects speech, in the form of words or expressive acts, rather than conduct
as such.52 Some courts, recognizing this distinction between communica-
tion and conduct, have held that a person's acknowledgment of his or her
homosexual identity is protected expression under the first amendment. 
3
Other courts, however, have found no meaningful first amendment in-
fringements in acknowledgments of homosexual orientation because they
have viewed such statements as admissions54 that the individual "engages
in, desires to engage in, or intends to engage in homosexual acts."55
Hardwick's influence concerning this latter view can be seen in the Ben-
Shalom II court's use of Hardwick to justify the presumption that the
Army's regulation actually targeted legitimately forbidden conduct
rather than protected communication.
5 6
Thus, in light of Hardwick's denial of the fundamental right of pri-
vacy with respect to consensual homosexual sodomy, the distinction be-
tween orientation and conduct takes on added importance for protecting
the rights of homosexual persons.57 Ben-Shalom II is particularly signifi-
cant because Ben-Shalom was the first self-identified homosexual litigant
to challenge the military's policy of excluding homosexual individuals
solely on the basis of sexual orientation. 8
1370-71 (N.D. Cal. 1987) ("Hardwick simply did not address the issue of discrimination based
on sexual orientation or sexual preference itself."), rev'd in part and vacated in part, 895 F.2d
563 (9th Cir. 1990).
51. E.g., Matthews v. Marsh, 755 F.2d 182 (lst Cir. 1985) (vacating as advisory, in light of
new evidence suggesting conduct, district court's opinion that dismissal of member of Reserve
Officer Training Corps merely on basis of statement "I am a lesbian" violated first amend-
ment); Ben-Shalom I, 489 F. Supp. at 975 ("T]he petitioner was treated in the same way as
one who openly engages in homosexual activity, even though she is 'guilty' of nothing more
than having a homosexually-oriented personality.").
52. Conduct receives first amendment protection as expression if the conduct is intended
to communicate a message which an observer most likely would understand in the given con-
text. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409-11 (1974).
53. BenShalom, 703 F. Supp. at 1377; Matthews v. Marsh, No. 82-0216 P, slip op. at 39-
40 (D. Me. Apr. 3, 1984), vacated on other grounds, 755 F.2d 182 (1st Cir. 1985); Ben-Shalom
I, 489 F. Supp. at 976.
54. Ben-Shalom II, 881 F.2d at 462; Pruitt, 659 F. Supp. at 627; Johnson v. Orr, 617 F.
Supp. 170, 175 (D.C. Cal. 1985), aff'd mem., 787 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1986).
55. 32 C.F.R. pt. 41 app. A, pt. l(H)(1)(b)(1) (1989) (emphasis added).
56. See Ben-Shalom II, 881 F.2d at 461-62, 464-65; Pruitt, 659 F. Supp. at 627.
57. See Halley, supra note 47, at 966-71 (public sexual identification implicates free speech
and equal protection because both doctrines involve protection of political process).
58. Rivera, supra note 25, at 290. Other post-Hardwick cases involving plaintiffs who
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III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In 1974, Miriam Ben-Shalom enlisted in the United States Army
Reserve for a three-year period. 9 She graduated from the Army's Lead-
ership Academy and became an instructor at the Fourth Brigade Drill
Sergeant Academy.' ° On several occasions, she publicly announced that
she was a lesbian.61 She was an excellent instructor,62 and neither her
immediate supervisors nor her students seemed concerned about her les-
bianism.63 Nevertheless, Ben-Shalom's statements acknowledging her
lesbian orientation led to her honorable discharge in 1976.04 The
grounds for her discharge were set forth in an Army regulation which
authorized "discharge of any soldier who 'evidences homosexual tenden-
cies, desire, or interest, but is without overt homosexual acts.' "65
After being discharged, Ben-Shalom initiated her first suit against
were discharged on the basis of orientation alone include Watkins, 875 F.2d at 709-11 (estop-
ping Army from refusing to reenlist plaintiff on basis of his sexual orientation because Army
had known for fourteen years that plaintiff was gay); Woodward, 871 F.2d at 1074-76 & 1074
n.6 (upholding Navy discharge of reserve officer and noting discharge not based solely on
orientation because officer made no claim to celibacy, had expressed his intention to socialize
with other homosexual individuals, and had "visited an Officers' Club with an enlisted man
who was awaiting discharge from the Navy for homosexuality"); Steffan v. Cheney, 733 F.
Supp. 121, 122-26 (D.D.C. 1989) (dismissing former midshipman's claim that United States
Naval Academy disenrolled him solely on basis of his sexual orientation, after midshipman
refused court's order to answer deposition questions as to whether he had engaged in homosex-
ual conduct during or since his enrollment); Pruitt, 659 F. Supp. at 626-27 (dismissing first
amendment challenge by Army Reserve chaplain who revealed lesbian orientation during
newspaper interview about gay church).
59. benShalom v. Secretary of Army (Ben-Shalom I), 489 F. Supp. 964, 969 (E.D. Wis.
1980), aff'd on other grounds, 826 F.2d 722 (7th Cir. 1987). At the time of her enlistment,
Ben-Shalom was in college and needed extra income to support her six-year-old daughter. P.
JOHNSON, PROFILES ENCOURAGE 10 (1988). Ben-Shalom joined the Army Reserve in part
because it fit the demands of her schedule better than other employment and in part because
she wanted to show that women could bear the same responsibilities as men and that gays and
lesbians could serve with honor. Id.
60. Ben-Shalom I, 489 F. Supp. at 969.
61. P. JOHNSON, supra note 59, at 10. On her enlistment application form, Ben-Shalom
revealed her membership in the Milwaukee Gay People's Union and in the New York Radical
Lesbians but answered "No" to the query, "Do you have any homosexual tendencies" on the
theory that she was a homosexual person and thus had no "tendencies." Id. Ben-Shalom
acknowledged her lesbianism in conversations with her colleagues, in an interview with an
Army newspaper reporter, and while teaching her class for drill sergeants. Ben-Shalom I, 489
F. Supp. at 969.
62. Ben-Shalom I, 489 F. Supp. at 969.
63. Id. at 973.
64. Id. at 969.
65. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting AR 135-178 7-5(b)(6)). Initially, the Army charged
Ben-Shalom with homosexual conduct, but this charge was soon dropped, and the Army made
no further allegations concerning sexual conduct. Id.
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the Army.66 The district court granted Ben-Shalom's motion for sum-
mary judgment and ordered the Army to reinstate her.67 In 1987, after
delaying almost seven years, the Army complied with the order, and
Ben-Shalom completed the eleven remaining months of her initial enlist-
ment period.68
When her original term of enlistment neared its end, Ben-Shalom
applied for reenlistment.69 The Army rejected her application, however,
and Ben-Shalom filed a second suit against the Army.' During the time
between Ben-Shalom's initial discharge and the time of her application
for reenlistment, the DoD had reworded its directives concerning homo-
sexuality, and these changes were reflected in the Army's implementing
regulations.71 Thus, after Ben-Shalom applied for reenlistment, the
Army informed her that homosexuality was a nonwaivable disqualifica-
tion under its new regulation (Reenlistment Regulation), 72 and that she
66. See id. at 964.
67. Id. at 977. The district court held that the Army's regulation was overbroad because it
"chilled" the first amendment, U.S. CONsT. amend. I, rights of every soldier to associate freely
with homosexuals and to discuss or read about homosexuality. Ben-Shalom I, 489 F. Supp. at
974. In failing to distinguish homosexual "personality" from homosexual activity, the Army
regulation also abridged the right to privacy inherent in the first amendment because the regu-
lation attempted to control thought and manifestations of personality. Id. at 975-76. Finally,
by neglecting to show a link between homosexual status and unfitness for service, the Army's
action was arbitrary and capricious, and violated Ben-Shalom's fifth amendment, U.S. CONST.
amend. V, right to substantive due process. Ben-Shalom I, 489 F. Supp. at 976-77.
68. Ben-Shalom v. Marsh (Ben-Shalom II), 881 F.2d 454, 456-57 (7th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 1296 (1990). The seven-year delay was not due to an appeal on the merits.
Id. at 456. Rather, the delay was caused by the Army's refusal to comply with the district
court's order and subsequent attempt to have the judgment set aside pursuant to a Rule 60(b)
motion. Id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). The Seventh Circuit ultimately affirmed the reinstatement
order on the ground that a Rule 60(b) motion could not be used to relitigate the merits in lieu
of appeal. Ben-Shalom II, 881 F.2d at 456.
69. Ben-Shalom II, 881 F.2d at 457.
70. Id.
71. See id.; Rivera, supra note 25, at 291, 296. The Ben-Shalom I court declared unconsti-
tutional an Army regulation that'authorized discharge of any individual evidencing a homo-
sexual "'tendency, desire or interest.'" Ben-Shalom I, 489 F. Supp. at 974 (quoting AR 135-
178 7-5(b)(6)). The new DoD directives disqualified a person "who engages in, desires to
engage in, or intends to engage in homosexual acts." Dept. Def. Directive No. 1332.14 encl. 3,
pt. l(H)(b)(1) (1982) (current version at 32 C.F.R. pt. 41 app. A, pt. I(H)(1)(b)(l) (1989));
Dept. Def. Directive No. 1332.30 encl. 1(7) (1986). Homosexual acts were defined as "bodily
contact, actively undertaken or passively permitted, between members of the same sex for the
purpose of satisfying sexual desires." 32 C.F.R. pt. 41 app. A, pt. l(H)(1)(b)(3); Dept. Def.
Directive No. 1332.30 encl. 1(8).
72. AR 140-111, table 4-2, rule E (1989). The following characteristics automatically dis-
qualify a reenlistment applicant:
E. Questionable moral character, history of antisocial behavior, sexual perversion,
homosexuality (includes an individual who is an admitted homosexual but as to
whom there is no evidence that they [sic] have engaged in homosexual acts either
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would be ineligible for military service unless she rebutted the presump-
tion of her homosexuality within thirty days.73 Ben-Shalom once again
stated that she was a lesbian, and, when the Army denied her reenlist-
ment, she sought judicial relief.74
The district court found no cognizable difference between the Reen-
listment Regulation and the regulation that had been declared unconsti-
tutional eight years earlier in Ben-Shalom P'7 The district court
concluded that the argument that "acknowledgment of status equals reli-
able evidence of [a] propensity" to engage in prohibited conduct was "lit-
tle more than a euphemism for prejudice."76 Thus, the district court
before or during military service, or has committed homosexual acts), or having fre-
quent difficulties with law enforcement agencies.
Id. (emphasis added).
An accompanying note further defines the criteria for excluding individuals on the basis of
homosexuality:
1. Homosexual acts consist of bodily contact between persons of the same sex,
actively undertaken or passively permitted, with the intent of obtaining or giving
sexual gratification, or any proposal, solicitation or attempt to perform such an act.
Individuals who have been involved in homosexual acts in an apparently isolated
episode, stemming solely from immaturity, curiosity, or intoxication, and absent
other evidence that the individual is a homosexual, normally will not be excluded
from service. A homosexual is an individual, regardless of sex, who desires bodily
contact between persons of the same sex, actively undertaken or passively permitted,
with the intent of obtaining or giving sexual gratification. Any official, private, or
public profession of homosexuality may be considered in determining whether an indi-
vidual is an admitted homosexual.
Id. n.1 (emphasis added). AR 135-178, governing separation is similar to this reenlistment
regulation. Compare AR 135-178 10-4(a) (1989) with AR 140-111, table 4-2, rule E.
In turn, the separation regulation is essentially the same as the DoD directive regarding
enlisted personnel. Compare AR 135-178 10-4(a) with 32 C.F.R. pt. 41 app. A, pt.
l(H)(1)(c)(1). The separation regulation, however, includes the following example of circum-
stances which might indicate that an individual would be unlikely to engage in further homo-
sexual conduct: "[Tihe act occurred solely as a result of immaturity, intoxication, coercion, or
a desire to avoid military service." AR 135-178 V 10-4(a)(2).
In addition, the separation regulation specifies that:
To warrant retention of a member after finding that he or she engaged in, attempted
to engage in, or solicited another to engage in a homosexual act or acts, the board
must specifically make allfive findings listed .... The intent of this policy is to
permit retention only of nonhomosexual soldiers ....
Id. 10-4(a)(5) note. See supra note 35 for the five findings which are required to successfully
rebut the presumption of homosexuality. The separation regulation also applies to bisexuals
and persons who marry someone "known to be of the same biological sex." AR 135-178 10-
4(b), (c).
73. Ben-Shalom II, 881 F.2d at 457.
74. Id. Ben-Shalom first moved for, and was granted, a temporary order enjoining the
Army from denying her reenlistment on the basis of her sexual orientation. benShalom v.
Marsh, 690 F. Supp. 774 (E.D. Wis. 1988), aff'd, 703 F. Supp. 1372 (E.D. Wis. 1989), rev'd,
881 F.2d 454, cert, denied, 110 S. Ct. 1296 (1990).
75. BenShalom v. Marsh, 703 F. Supp. 1372, 1377 (E.D. Wis. 1989), rev'd, 881 F.2d 454,
cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 1296 (1990).
76. Id.
EQUATING SPEECH WITH CONDUCT
held that the Reenlistment Regulation facially violated the first amend-
ment by "unreasonably" chilling speech.77 Furthermore, because sexual
orientation was unrelated to a person's "ability to perform or contribute
to the military," the Reenlistment Regulation did not rationally serve the
Army's interests and, thus, could not survive an equal protection chal-
lenge.7" On appeal, however, a three-judge panel of the Seventh Circuit
reversed.79
IV. REASONING OF THE COURT
A. The First Amendment
The foundation for the Seventh Circuit's first amendment analysis
was its acceptance of the Army's "common sense" argument" that an
admission of homosexual orientation "reasonably implies... a 'desire' to
commit homosexual acts" and that this desire might lead to action.8'
Therefore, the panel found that the Reenlistment Regulation was aimed
primarily at conduct and concluded that the incidental restriction on
speech was not of constitutional magnitude.8 2
Furthermore, the panel felt constrained to defer to the determina-
tion by military authorities that the presence of homosexual individuals
"might imperil" the military mission. 3 Such determinations were not to
be "second-guessed" by the courts.8 4 Even though some prejudice
against homosexual persons existed in the Army and even though judges
were "opponents of prejudice," judges lacked the military knowledge




As with its first amendment analysis, 6 the critical assumption in the
Seventh Circuit's equal protection analysis was that homosexual orienta-
tion implied homosexual conduct.8 7 Because criminalization of homo-
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1380. See supra note 33 for the interests purportedly served by the Army's
regulation.
79. Ben-Shalom II, 881 F.2d at 466.
80. Id. at 461.
81. Id. at 460-61.





87. Id. at 464.
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sexual conduct was constitutionally acceptable,"8 the panel reasoned that
homosexual persons could not constitute a suspect or quasi-suspect
class.8 9 Therefore, the Reenlistment Regulation did not merit heightened
scrutiny,90 and the panel was obliged to apply only the most deferential
level of review,91 the rational basis test.92 Under that test, the challenged
regulation was rationally related to the Army's objectives.93
The panel concluded its equal protection analysis by stressing again
that Ben-Shalom I1 arose in a military context.94 Thus, any change in
military policy was properly within the purview of the legislative and
executive branches of government. 9
V. ANALYSIS
The Seventh Circuit's reasoning in Ben-Shalom v. Marsh (Ben-Sha-
lom 11)96 was based on misconceptions about sexuality,97 a misunder-
standing of first amendment principles,98 an overbroad reading of
precedent concerning judicial deference to the military99 and miscat-
egorization of the relevant classification for equal protection purposes. I°°
This section discusses popular misconceptions about sexuality, and ho-
mosexuality in particular, which appear to have guided some of the
panel's reasoning. Then, this section analyzes the panel's use of first
amendment precedent regarding freedom of speech, thought and person-
ality and judicial deference to the military. Finally, this section addresses
the issue of equal protection raised by the Army's discriminatory sup-
pression of speech on the basis of sexual orientation.
88. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986).
89. Ben-Shalom 11, 881 F.2d at 464. See supra note 45 for a definition of suspect and
quasi-suspect classes.
90. See Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440-41 (1985).
91. Ben-Shalom I, 881 F.2d at 464.
92. Under a rational basis test, a restriction does not violate equal protection if "the classi-
fication drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest." Cleburne, 473
U.S. at 440. Courts tend to presume that the state's interest is legitimate and will find a "ra-
tional relationship" if there is any conceivable set of past, present or future facts which might
justify delineating the classification. See, e.g., Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635 (1986); Mc-
Gowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955); see
L. TRIBE, supra note 8, § 16-2, at 1442-43, § 16-3, at 1443.
93. Ben-Shalom II, 881 F.2d at 465. See supra note 33 for a list of the objectives which
form the basis for the military's exclusion of homosexual persons.
94. Ben-Shalom II, 881 F.2d at 465-66.
95. Id. at 466.
96. 881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1296 (1990).
97. See infra notes 105-31 and accompanying text.
98. U.S. CONST. amend. I; see infra notes 146-75 and accompanying text.
99. See infra notes 258-306 and accompanying text.
100. U.S. CONST. amend. V; see infra notes 307-36 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 24:421
January 1991] EQUATING SPEECH WITH CONDUCT
A. Misconceptions About Sexuality
Three misconceptions about sexuality seem to underlie the court's
analysis in Ben-Shalom v. Marsh (Ben-Shalom 1).101 First, the panel
equated sexual orientation with sexual conduct, at least where homosex-
ual persons were concerned. 102 Second, the panel seems to have assumed
that homosexual individuals are more preoccupied with sex and, thus,
less likely to control their sexual conduct than heterosexual persons.
10 3
Third, the panel impliedly approved the notion that, because homosexual
acts could be criminalized, the Army could exclude homosexual individ-
uals just as it could exclude other persons likely to engage in criminal
conduct, such as arsonists and kleptomaniacs." °
1. Misconception: sexual orientation predicts conduct
The appellate court accepted the Army's "common sense" argument
that a homosexual person's "desire" will probably ripen into action, and
that expressions of sexual orientation are reliable indicators of sexual
conduct.0 5 The Army, however, has known since the Crittenden Re-
port,1"6 a 1957 report on homosexuality prepared under the auspices of
all branches of the military, that this "common sense" argument was not
101. 881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1296 (1990).
102. See id. at 460-62, 464.
103. Compare id at 464 (admission of homosexual desire is sufficient for predicting prob-
able conduct; thus, "[tihe Army need not try to fine tune a regulation to fit a particular les-
bian's subjective thoughts and propensities.") with benShalom v. Secretary of Army (Ben-
Shalom I), 489 F. Supp. 964, 975 (E.D. Wis. 1980) ("Just as some heterosexuals have, through-
out human history, chosen to forego sexual activity for a variety of reasons, it cannot be as-
sumed that all who have personalities oriented toward homosexuality necessarily engage in
homosexual conduct."), aff'd on other grounds, 826 F.2d 722 (7th Cir. 1987).
104. See Ben-Shalom II, 881 F.2d at 460-61, 464. In accepting the Army's "common
sense" argument that conduct rationally could be inferred from orientation, the appellate panel
impliedly accepted the analogy to kleptomaniacs and arsonists that the Army made in oral
argument. See Separate Appendix at 27, Ben-Shalom II (Nos. 88-2771, 89-1213) (transcript of
oral argument before district court on Oct. 4, 1988) (on file at Loyola of Los Angeles Law
Review).
105. Ben-Shalom II, 881 F.2d at 459-61.
106. Report of the Board Appointed to Prepare and Submit Recommendations to the Sec-
retary of the Navy for the Revision of Policies, Procedures and Directives.Dealing with Homo-
sexuals 1 (Dec. 21, 1956 to Mar. 15, 1957) (unpublished report) (on file at Loyola of Los
Angeles Law Review) [hereinafter Crittenden Report].
The Crittenden Report was prepared by a five-man board, chaired by Captain S. Crit-
tenden, Jr. of the United States Navy. E. GIBSON, GET OFF MY SHIP app. E at 357 (1978).
The Navy had commissioned the report, but representatives of all branches of the military
participated as witnesses. Crittenden Report, supra, at 1. The Navy suppressed the Crittenden
Report until 1977, releasing it only pursuant to a discovery request in Berg v. Claytor, 436 F.
Supp. 76 (D.C.C. 1977), vacated, 591 F.2d 849 (D.C. Cir. 1978). E. GIBSON, supra, at 357.
See id. at 357-65 for a synopsis of the Board's major findings.
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based on fact. The Crittenden Report acknowledged that "[ilt cannot be
said, as a generalization, that one or more instances of homosexual be-
havior makes an individual either more likely or less likely to participate
in homosexual acts in the future." 10 7
The Crittenden Report relied heavily on Dr. Alfred C. Kinsey's re-
search during the late 1940s and early 1950s. 10 Kinsey's studies showed
that a significant number of people are not exclusively heterosexual in
their sexual practices,109 and that an individual's sexual conduct is not
necessarily congruent with the individual's public or private sexual
identity.
110
A disparity between sexual orientation and conduct algo has been
found in studies limited to persons who identified themselves as gay or
lesbian.1 For example, one psychologist, reporting on college women,
107. Crittenden Report, supra note 106, at 5. The Board's chief finding was that "[m]any
common misconceptions pertaining to homosexuality have become exaggerated and perpetu-
ated over the years... [The fallacies inherent in these concepts are being demonstrated with
increasing frequency." Id. at 4-5. Although the Board suggested that the Navy adopt a "for-
ward-looking program," the Board did not recommend any real changes, probably because it
felt constrained by its original directive which was to find ways of implementing the Navy's
exclusionary policy. E. GIBSON, supra note 106, at 365-66.
108. See Crittenden Report, supra note 106, at 4. Alfred Kinsey conducted intensive inter-
views with thousands of male and female subjects about their sexual histories. A. KINSEY, W.
POMEROY & C. MARTIN, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE ix (1948) [hereinafter
HUMAN MALE]; A. KINSEY, W. POMEROY, C. MARTIN & P. GEBHARD, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR
IN THE HUMAN FEMALE 43 (1953) [hereinafter HUMAN FEMALE]. Kinsey rated the hetero-
homosexual dimension of these subjects on a scale from zero to six, with zero representing
exclusively heterosexual psychological responses and overt sexual conduct and six representing
exclusively homosexual psychological responses and overt sexual conduct. HUMAN MALE,
supra, at 639-41; HUMAN FEMALE, supra, at 471-72.
109. Kinsey's findings were based on case studies of 5,300 males and 5,940 females. HUMAN
MALE, supra note 108, at ix; HUMAN FEMALE, supra note 108, at 43. These studies yielded
the following results:
Accumulative Incidences Males Females
Homosexual psychological responses 50% 28%
Homosexual overt contacts to
point of orgasm 37% 13%
HUMAN FEMALE, supra note 108, at 474-75. Kinsey's studies have been the most compre-
hensive to date, and subsequent researchers have relied heavily on them. See PERSEREC
Report, supra note 23, app. C at 91.
110. See HUMAN MALE, supra note 108, at 616-17; HUMAN FEMALE, supra note 108, at
469. Subsequent researchers also have observed a disparity between sexual identity and con-
duct. Halley, supra note 47, at 941-46 (discussing "social-constructionist" studies of self-iden-
tified gays and lesbians).
111. E.g., Golden, Diversity and Variability in Women's Sexual Identities, in LESBIAN PSY-
CHOLOGIES 19, 31 (Boston Lesbian Psychologies Collective ed. 1987); McDonald, Individual
Differences in the Coming Out Process for Gay Men: Implications for Theoretical Models, 8 J.
HOMOSEXUALITY 47 (1982).
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observed:
Among women who identified themselves to me as lesbians,
there were some whose sexual behavior was explicitly and ex-
clusively lesbian, and some whose behavior was exclusively het-
erosexual or bisexual (these latter also described themselves as
"political lesbians"). In addition, I spoke with sexually inexpe-
rienced women who considered themselves to be lesbians.
Although no student ever self-consciously identified herself as a
celibate lesbian, this is a distinct possibility .... 
112
Another researcher found similar distinctions among gay men.113 Some
men identified themselves as gay without ever having participated in ho-
mosexual sex while others only accepted a gay identity after a long-term
homosexual relationship had ended.I14
Even without the benefit of such studies, the Seventh Circuit should
have realized, as did the lower court,11 that sexual orientation and sex-
ual conduct are separate issues. The distinction is implicit in society's
recognition that people do not lose their sexual orientation when they are
celibate-asexuality and celibacy are not synonymous.
1 16
2. Misconception: homosexual persons are more preoccupied with
sex than heterosexual persons
A corollary to the assumption that homosexual orientation reliably
indicates a person's "propensity" '117 to engage in proscribed sexual con-
duct is the assumption that sex is necessarily a major focus of homosex-
112. Golden, supra note 111, at 30.
113. McDonald, supra note 111, at 52-53.
114. Id. Out of a group of 199 gay men, 18% acknowledged they were gay without ever
having had a homosexual experience, 10% recognized they were gay at the time of their first
same-sex sexual encounter, 22% defined themselves as gay while involved in a long-term ho-
mosexual relationship, and 23% identified themselves as gay only after such a relationship had
ended. Id.
115. BenShalom v. Marsh, 703 F. Supp. 1372, 1377-80 (E.D. Wis.), rev'd, 881 F.2d 454 (7th
Cir. 1989), cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 1296 (1990).
116. Compare WEBSTER'S THIRD NEw INT'L DICTIONARY 127 (1976) (defining "asexual-
ity" as "absence of sex") [hereinafter WEBsTER'S] with id. at 359 (defining "celibacy" as "ab-
stention from sexual intercourse"). The problem with the Seventh Circuit's conflation of
orientation and conduct may be illustrated by applying the panel's reasoning to a case of dis-
qualification of a bisexual soldier, which is also required under Army regulations. See AR
135-178 % 10-4(b) (1989); AR 140-111, table 4-2, rule E n.1 (1989). If this hypothetical sol-
dier identified himself as bisexual but was currently involved in a monogamous, heterosexual
relationship and had never had a homosexual encounter, would his self-identifying statement
still be an admission of probable homosexual conduct?
117. The Seventh Circuit never specifically defined "propensity" in terms of any statistical
probabilities. Therefore, it is reasonably assumed that the court used the word in its general
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ual individuals.118 Homosexual persons, however, are no more
preoccupied with sex than heterosexual persons.1 9
Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit seems to have assumed that ho-
mosexual individuals generally are more sex-driven than heterosexual in-
dividuals when it implied that homosexual servicepersons would engage
in sexual conduct in communal quarters or other public places. 2 ' The
panel did not explain how it arrived at this conclusion, 12 1 nor why extant
military regulations prohibiting certain sexual acts were effective for con-
trolling the sexual conduct of heterosexual persons yet ineffective for
controlling the sexual conduct of homosexual personnel.1 22 In addition,
the panel did not offer any support for its apparent assumption that sex-
sense as "a natural inclination: innate or inherent tendency." WEBSTER'S, supra note 116, at
1817.
The panel's use of a word which implies "tendency" to justify its conclusion that speech
reflects probable conduct is somewhat ironic. The panel took pains to distinguish the Army's
current regulation from the one held unconstitutional in Ben-Shalom I. See Ben-Shalom II,
881 F.2d at 460. The Ben-Shalom II panel noted that the new regulation had been purged of
the constitutionally offensive "tendency" language. Id. Yet, in relying on the concept of "pro-
pensity," the panel interjected the notion of "tendency" into the new regulation. See WEB-
STER'S, supra note 116, at 1817 (defining "propensity").
Additionally, the Army seems to have retained the concept of "tendency." A previous
"discharge for homosexual tendencies" is still a nonwaivable disqualification for reenlistment
applicants, AR 140-111, table 4-2, rule M (emphasis added), even though "tendency" is not
used in rule E. See AR 140-111, table 4-2, rule E.
118. PERSEREC Report, supra note 23, at 37.
Those who resist changing the traditional policies support their position with
statements of the negative effects on discipline, morale, and other abstract values of
military life. Buried deep in the supporting conceptual structure is the fearful im-
agery of homosexuals polluting the social environment with unrestrained and wanton
expressions of deviant sexuality. It is as if persons with nonconforming sexual orien-
tations were always indiscriminately and aggressively seeking sexual outlets. All the
studies conducted on the psychological adjustment of homosexuals that we have seen
lead to contrary inferences.
Id.
119. Id. "Whether in an Army platoon or in a brokerage office, people are generally selec-
tive in their choice of intimate partners and in their expression of sexual behavior." Id. Ho-
mosexual individuals may even be less preoccupied with sex than heterosexual individuals. Id.
(citing Bell, Homosexualities: Their Range and Character, 21 NEB. SYMP. ON MOTIVATION 1-
26 (1973)).
120. See Ben-Shalom II, 881 F.2d at 465. In addition to referring to "privacy" in its consti-
tutional sense, the Seventh Circuit also seemed to use the term in its more literal sense, See id.
The panel noted that, in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), Hardwick's conduct had
occurred within the confines of his bedroom. Ben-Shalom II, 881 F.2d at 465. In contrast,
Ben-Shalom presumably would engage in conduct that would have an "impact on other
soldiers." Id. The implication of this comparison is that if Ben-Shalom were to engage in
sexual activity she would do so in a place where her fellow soldiers could observe her conduct.
121. See Ben-Shalom II, 881 F.2d at 465.
122. Note, Permitting Prejudice to Govern: Equal Protection, Military Deference, and the
Exclusion of Lesbians and Gay Men From the Military, 17 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE
171, 182 (1989-90). The UCMJ does not distinguish between heterosexual and homosexual
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ual orientation is a determinative factor for deciding whether an individ-
ual is likely to refrain from sexual activity.123
3. Misconception: all homosexual expressions of affection involve
criminal conduct
The Seventh Circuit also upheld the Reenlistment Regulation on the
theory that homosexual conduct only involves acts that may be criminal-
ized, 124 such as sodomy. 125 Homosexual conduct, however, encompasses
a variety of erotic and affectionate acts, such as kissing and hugging,126
which Congress and state legislatures have not defined as criminal.
127
Furthermore, if it is correct to presume that a homosexual orienta-
tion suggests a tendency to commit criminal sexual acts, heterosexual
persons may be equally vulnerable to expulsion on the basis of their sex-
ual orientation. The Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ)128
criminalizes both homosexual and heterosexual sodomy, 129 and the
United States Supreme Court has not yet held that sodomy laws are inap-
plicable to heterosexual persons.1 30 No factual basis exists for assuming
conduct. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 880, 925(a), 933, 934 (1988). See supra note 21 for the relevant
provisions of the UCMJ.
123. Compare Ben-Shalom II, 881 F.2d at 464 (dismissing importance of individual les-
bian's ability to remain celibate) with BenShalom, 703 F. Supp. at 1377 and Ben-Shalom I, 489
F. Supp. at 975 (noting that differences in sexual orientation do not warrant assumption that
ability to "forego sexual activity" will be different).
124. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 196 (sodomy); United States v. Harris, 8 M.J. 52, 58 (C.M.A.
1979) (cunnilingus); United States v. Scoby, 5 M.J. 160, 166 (C.M.A. 1978) (fellatio); 10
U.S.C. § 925(a) (sodomy).
125. See Ben-Shalom I, 881 F.2d at 461, 464.
126. Watkins v. United States Army, 875 F.2d 699, 714 (9th Cir. 1989) (Norris, J., concur-
ring), cert. denied, 59 U.S.L.W. 3340 (U.S. Nov. 6, 1990) (No. 89-1806); Comment, The Tie
That Binds: Recognizing Privacy and the Family Commitments of Same-Sex Couples, 23 Loy.
L.A.L. EVv. 1055, 1070 n.99 (1990). Lesbians may define eroticism without reference to
specific physical acts. Adrienne Rich, poet and feminist thinker, asserts that patriarchal defini-
tions of eroticism are quite different from female definitions. See Rich, Compulsory Heterosex-
uality and Lesbian Existence, 5 SIGNs 631, 650 (1980). The patriarchal perception is
"clinical," whereas the female vision of eroticism "is unconfined to any single part of the body
or solely to the body itself." Id.
127. See Watkins, 875 F.2d at 715 n.6 (Norris, J., concurring); PERSEREC Report, supra
note 23, app. A at 77. The federal proscription against sodomy is primarily limited to the
military. 10 U.S.C. § 925(a). Congress, however, also proscribes homosexual acts indirectly
by providing that state law will define offenses not otherwise enumerated in the federal statute
pertaining to crimes committed on Indian reservations by one Indian against another. 18
U.S.C. § 1153 (1988). If one considers that, as of 1988, 25 states had no laws against sodomy
between consenting adults, see PERSEREC Report, supra note 23, app. A at 75, the scope of
the prohibition against homosexual sodomy on Indian lands is quite limited.
128. Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-941 (1988).
129. See 10 U.S.C. § 925(a). See supra note 21 for the relevant portion of section 925.
130. See Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 196 n.8.
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that homosexual people are more likely than heterosexual people to par-
ticipate in sodomitic or other criminal sexual acts.
131
B. Legal Precedent for Equating Sexual Orientation with Conduct
The common theme of the foregoing misconceptions is that homo-
sexual individuals constitute a discrete population reliably defined by
conduct. While the Seventh Circuit did not expressly rely on these mis-
conceptions, it similarly equated homosexual status with conduct.
1 32
Not only does this equation contravene basic principles of criminal law,
it also subverts the protection given to communication, as distinct from
mere conduct, under the first amendment.
1. Punishment on the basis of status
The notion that a person's actions can be presumed from his or her
status is clearly unsound according to criminal law concepts.1 33 In
Robinson v. California,1 34 the Supreme Court struck down a California
statute which imposed criminal penalties on narcotics addicts solely on
the basis of their status as addicts.1 35 As Justice Harlan made clear in his
concurrence:
Since addiction alone cannot reasonably be thought to amount
to more than a compelling propensity to use narcotics, the ef-
fect of [the trial court's] instruction was to authorize criminal
punishment for a bare desire to commit a criminal act.
If the California statute reaches this type of conduct.., it
is an arbitrary imposition which exceeds the power that a state
may exercise in enacting its criminal law.
1 36
The Army has argued that Robinson is inapposite to cases involving
exclusion of homosexual persons because the Army's regulation imposes
131. See PERSEREC Report, supra note 23, app. A at 77 (UCMJ proscription against
sodomy usually applied "to punish acts which involve force and/or a minor or nonconsenting
partner. The larger percentage of such prosecuted acts are heterosexual.").
132. See Ben-Shalom v. Marsh (Ben-Shalom II), 881 F.2d 454, 460, 462 (7th Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1296 (1990).
133. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962); see also W. LAFAVE & A.
Sco rr, JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 4, at 16-17 (1972) (discussing criminal intent and criminal act
as essential elements of any crime).
134. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
135. Id. at 666-68.
136. Id. at 678-79 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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no criminal sanctions. 137 While this is technically correct, 138 fairness de-
mands that, if the Army wishes to treat homosexual persons as criminals,
comparing them to arsonists and kleptomaniacs, 39 it should not be al-
lowed to avoid the most basic precept of criminal law-guilt must be
shown by proof of criminal intent and a criminal act.14°
Aside from the fact that the Army's regulation is not penal in na-
ture, the Army's comparison of homosexuality with arson and kleptoma-
nia is also inappropriate because homosexuality is neither a crime against
person or property, nor a mental disorder. 41 Even though certain ho-
mosexual conduct may be criminalized, 142 as one commentator has
noted, the statements "I am a lesbian" and "I am a burglar" carry quite
different implications. 143 The first statement, unlike the latter, not only
implies many activities which are not criminal, but also constitutes an
integral part of the public discourse on political and social issues.1
In light of this public discourse aspect to public acknowledgments of
homosexual orientation, it would be more appropriate to analogize ho-
mosexual persons to Communist Party members than to arsonists or
kleptomaniacs. As cases dealing with the Communist Party hold, mere
membership in an organization which advocates action to overthrow the
137. See Matthews v. Marsh, No. 82-0216 P, slip op. at 14 (D. Me. Apr. 3, 1984), vacated,
755 F.2d 182 (1st Cir. 1985). Matthews was a first amendment challenge, and the facts sur-
rounding Matthews' discharge were very similar to the facts in Ben-Shalom's case. Compare
id. at 1-3 with BenShalom v. Marsh, 703 F. Supp. 1372, 1373-74 (E.D. Wis.), rev'd, 881 F.2d
454 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1296 (1990). Matthews told her commanding
officer that she was a lesbian when the officer questioned her about why she needed to attend a
gay student organization meeting. Matthews, No. 82-0216 P, slip op. at 2. Ben-Shalom re-
vealed her lesbianism during a military class on minority and race relations and also identified
herself as a "radical lesbian feminist" in an interview for a military newspaper. P. JOHNSON,
supra note 59, at 10.
The First Circuit vacated the district court's opinion, in which the lower court had or-
dered Matthews' reinstatement, because subsequently Matthews had admitted to having com-
mitted homosexual acts. Matthews v. Marsh, 755 F.2d 182, 183 (1st Cir. 1985). In light of
this new evidence, the circuit court held that the lower court's decision was an impermissible
advisory opinion. Id. at 184.
138. Matthews, No. 82-0216 P, slip op. at 14.
139. See Separate Appendix at 27, Ben-Shalom II (Nos. 88-2771 & 89-1213). The district
court found that the Army's comparison of homosexuality with arson and kleptomania exem-
plified the "purposeful discrimination" directed against homosexual people. BenShalom v.
Marsh, 703 F. Supp. 1372, 1379 (E.D. Wis.), rev'd, 881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
110 S. Ct. 1296 (1990).
140. See W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTr, JR., supra note 133, § 4, at 16-17.
141. See PERSEREC Report, supra note 23, at 20-21, 39.
142. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986).
143. Halley, supra note 47, at 974-75.
144. Id. See infra notes 232-38 for a discussion concerning statements of sexual orientation
as political speech.
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government does not support a presumption that a member will take
such action at the first opportunity.1 4 5 For similar reasons, a person's
homosexual status should not be a legitimate basis for presuming that he
or she will engage in proscribed sexual conduct.
2. Speech versus conduct: the O'Brien test
In a civilian context, 46 the threshold question 47 in a first amend-
ment analysis is whether the regulation at issue is a content-based restric-
tion,1 48 meriting strict scrutiny, 149 or a content-neutral restriction, 5 '
reviewable under a more relaxed standard. 1 If a regulation is facially
content-neutral, the court should inquire whether the governmental in-
terest served is truly unrelated to the suppression of speech.1 52 In mak-
ing this determination, it is irrelevant whether the communication is in
the form of words or in the form of conduct which may be characterized
145. E.g., Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 227-28 (1961); Yates v. United States, 354
U.S. 298, 331-32 (1957).
146. See infra notes 258-306 and accompanying text for a discussion of the effect of a mili-
tary context on a first amendment analysis.
147. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 481 (1988).
148. Content-based restrictions are those that are "aimed at communicative impact." See
L. TRIBE, supra note 8, § 12-2, at 789-90. Generally, such regulations restrict the flow of ideas
or information by suppressing speech on the basis of the topic involved, the viewpoint ex-
pressed, or the identity of the speaker. Id. § 12-3, at 803.
149. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). To survive
strict scrutiny, a content-based regulation must be "necessary to serve a compelling state inter-
est and... narrowly drawn to achieve that end." Id.
150. Content-neutral regulations are those that are directed toward achieving a goal unre-
lated to the suppression of information or ideas but nevertheless limit "communicative oppor-
tunity." See L. TRIBE, supra note 8, § 12-2, at 789-90. Typically, such restrictions impose
limits on the time, place or manner of speech. E.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 109 S. Ct.
2746 (1989) (regulation of volume of amplified music at concerts in park near residential area);
City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41 (1986) (restricting location of adult-movie
houses); Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984) (bar on posting election
campaign posters on public utility poles).
151. A content-neutral restriction "must be narrowly tailored to serve the government's
legitimate content-neutral interest but.., it need not be the least-restrictive or least-intrusive
means of doing so." Rock Against Racism, 109 S. Ct. at 2757-58.
152. See Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2540-41 (1989). A regulation which is facially
neutral demands further inquiry because the government will tend to justify a facially neutral
but content-based restriction on the ground that it is really targeting a nonspeech-related dan-
ger. See L. TRIBE, supra note 8, § 12-3, at 794; Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the
Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. Rv. 1482,
1496 (1975). If the court looks only at this purported ultimate interest, almost any restriction
can survive judicial review because the standard of review for content-neutral restrictions is
less demanding. See Ely, supra, at 1496. Therefore, a court's first inquiry should be whether
the harm the government is trying to prevent would occur regardless of the content of the
communication. Id. at 1497. If the answer is negative, the regulation is most likely content-
based and should be strictly scrutinized. Id.
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as expressive.' 53
The Seventh Circuit in Ben-Shalom v. Marsh (Ben-Shalom I1)"s4
displayed a misunderstanding of these principles by reviewing the
Army's regulation according to the standard enunciated in United States
v. O'Brien. 5 ' The panel selected O'Brien as the appropriate test on the
grounds that the challenged regulation was aimed at conduct and that
Ben-Shalom's verbal expressions could be deemed conduct in two
ways. 156 The panel reasoned that Ben-Shalom's statement that she was a
lesbian was in effect an admission that she had a propensity to commit
homosexual acts.'" 7 This characterization of Ben-Shalom's statement as
conduct conformed with the "common sense" argument that the Army
had presented to the court. 158 In an apparent attempt to solve the riddle
of how words could be conduct, however, the panel also isolated the con-
duct as being Ben-Shalom's "act of identification."'5 9 Having thus re-
moved Ben-Shalom's statement from the realm of speech to conduct, the
panel applied the O'Brien formula."6
The O'Brien test is a weak standard of review identical to the stan-
dard used for content-neutral regulations involving restrictions related to
the time, place or manner of protected speech. 6' The O'Brien test is
designed for regulations that are unrelated to expression but which, nev-
153. See Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2540; Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409-10 (1974).
Conduct is protected as expression if it is intended to convey a particular message which, in the
context, a viewer would be likely to understand. Spence, 418 U.S. at 410-11.
154. 881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1296 (1990).
155. 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968). In O'Brien, the United States Supreme Court announced
the following test for determining whether a regulation aimed at conduct unconstitutionally
abridges freedom of expression:
[W]hen "speech" and "nonspeech" elements are combined in the same course of
conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech
element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms .... [A]
government regulation is sufficiently justified if... it furthers an important or sub-
stantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the sup-
pression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that
interest.
Id.
156. Ben-Shalom II, 881 F.2d at 464.
157. See id. at 460-61.
158. See id. at 461.
159. See id. at 462 (emphasis added).
160. See supra note 155 for the O'Brien test.
161. Rock Against Racism, 109 S. Ct. at 2757. Although O'Brien requires that any inciden-
tal restriction on speech be no greater than that which is necessary for serving the governmen-
tal interest, O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377, in practice this requirement is given little strength. See
Rock Against Racism, 109 S. Ct. at 2758 (regulation valid if government's interest served more
effectively with than without regulation).
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ertheless, have an incidental impact on speech. 162
The United States Supreme Court formulated the O'Brien standard
in response to a regulation prohibiting the destruction of draft cards.
163
O'Brien had burned his draft card to express his antiwar beliefs and ar-
gued that his act was protected "symbolic speech." 164 The Court, how-
ever, found that the regulation was meant to ensure efficient operation of
the Selective Service system and, thus, served the government's legiti-
mate interest in raising armies.1 6' Because the law was indifferent as to a
person's reason for destroying a draft card, it was not aimed at sup-
pressing the communicative impact of any particular act of destruc-
tion.1 66  Therefore, O'Brien's right to free speech had not been
abridged.167
The Seventh Circuit's choice of O'Brien as the standard of review
was inappropriate. The O'Brien test is not always relevant when a regu-
lation restricts conduct rather than speech per se.1 68 As with facially
content-neutral time, place or manner restrictions, the initial query is
whether the restriction is aimed at communicative impact.1 69 When, as
in Ben-Shalom II, the regulation on its face targets both speech and con-
duct,17° O'Brien is inapposite to the portion dealing with speech because
that portion clearly is aimed at communicative impact. 71 O'Brien is
only relevant to the portion of a regulation that restricts conduct, and
then only if the statutory aim is unrelated to suppressing the communica-
tive impact of such conduct.
17 2
The Seventh Circuit's equation of speech with conduct was a return
to the type of thinking embodied in the discredited173 eighteenth century
English concept of constructive treason. 74 Under that doctrine, speech
was deemed evidence of the treasonous act of imagining the sovereigu's
death. 7 In choosing to apply O'Brien to the Army's regulation, the
162. See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376.
163. Id. at 370.
164. Id. at 376.
165. Id. at 381-82.
166. Id. at 375.
167. Id. at 382.
168. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2540.
169. Id.
170. AR 140-111, table 4-2, rule E (1989). See supra note 72 for the text of rule E.
171. See Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2540.
172. Id. at 2540-41.
173. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 276 (1964).
174. See L. LEvY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS 122-23 (1985).
175. Id. The verbal crime of treason was, thus, similar to the crimeof seditious libel. Id. at
123. Under common law, seditious libel was an "accordian-like concept, expandable or con-
tractible at the whim of judges.... [and generally] consisted of defaming or contemning or
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Seventh Circuit resurrected this doctrinal anomaly of speech as the
equivalent of conduct. The panel should have recognized Ben-Shalom's
statements for what they were-verbal expressions-and directly ad-
dresed the issue of whether such speech was protected communication
under the first amendment.
C. Communicative Impact and the Army's Interests
In conformity with a DoD directive,176 the Army excludes persons
"who [are] admitted homosexual[s] but as to whom there is no evidence
that they have engaged in homosexual acts either before or during mili-
tary service" '177 in order to:
a. Maintain discipline, good order, and morale.
b. Foster mutual trust and confidence among service
members.
c. Insure the integrity of the system of rank and command.
d. Facilitate assignment and worldwide deployment of service
members who frequently must live and work under close condi-
tions affording minimal privacy.
e. Recruit and retain members of military service.
f. Maintain the public acceptability of military service.
g. Prevent breaches of military security.17
Courts have generally accepted the substantiality of these military inter-
ests.1 79 This list, however, suggests that the military's overriding interest
is to avoid potential prejudicial reactions to homosexuality from both
ridiculing the government: its form, constitution, officers, laws, conduct, or policies, to the
jeopardy of the public peace." Id. at 8. The Sedition Act of 1798, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (1798)
(expired by its own terms in 1801), incorporated the common-law crime, but gave the jury the
duty of determining whether the words were criminal and made truth admissible as a defense.
L. LEvY, supra note 174, at 201-02. Nevertheless, the Sedition Act "nearly abolished freedom
of speech and press." Id.
Although the United States Supreme Court never ruled on its constitutionality, the Sedi-
tion Act was discredited when President Jefferson, in 1804, pardoned those punished under it
and when Congress, in 1840, repaid fines collected under it. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 276. As the
Court recognized in Sullivan, "These views reflect a broad consensus that the Act... was
inconsistent with the First Amendment." Id.
176. 32 C.F.R. pt. 41 app. A, pt. I(H) (1989).
177. AR 140-111, table 4-2, rule E (1989). See supra note 72 for the full text of rule E.
178. AR 135-178 110-2 (1989) (listing same policy factors set forth at 32 C.F.R. pt. 41 app.
A, pt. l(H)(1)(a)).
179. E.g., Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 508-09 (1986); Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S.
348, 354-55 (1980); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 758 (1974); Woodward v. United States, 871
F.2d 1068, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 1989), cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 1295 (1990); Rich v. Secretary of the
Army, 735 F.2d 1220, 1229 (10th Cir. 1984); Hatheway v. Secretary of the Army, 641 F.2d
1376, 1382 (9th Cir. 1981); Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788, 811 (9th Cir. 1980), cert
denied, 452 U.S. 905, cert denied, 454 U.S. 855 (1981).
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military personnel and the general public."' 0
All branches of the armed forces have known for a long time that
homosexual individuals can serve honorably and well.181 Therefore, poor
job performance is not the concern that underlies the military's an-
tihomosexual policy." 2 Rather, the Army's per se ban of gays and lesbi-
ans is based on the assumption that commonly held prejudice against
homosexual persons will prevent the group bonding which is a necessary
prerequisite for successful military performance." 3 The Army has stated
that the presence of homosexual soldiers creates morale and discipline
problems because heterosexual personnel in the lower ranks "despise and
detest" homosexuals.' 8 4 For similar reasons, homosexual officers pre-
180. Watkins v. United States Army, 875 F.2d 699, 728-29 (9th Cir. 1989) (Norris, J., con-
curring) (discussing Army reenlistment regulation identical to AR 140-111), cert. denied, 111
S. Ct. 384 (1990); Rich, 735 F.2d at 1227 n.7 ("[F]orcing heterosexuals to live and work with
homosexuals would produce friction... permitting homosexuals in the military would de-
crease its prestige and image resulting in an adverse impact on recruiting."); Matthews v.
Marsh, No. 82-0216 P, slip op. at 33 (D. Me. Apr. 3, 1984) (discussing identical Army regula-
tions governing separation of Army Reserve officers), vacated, 755 F.2d 182 (1st Cir. 1985).
181. See Gross, Admiral Says Lesbian Sailors Must Go, Despite Good Work, L.A. Daily J.,
Sept. 10, 1990, § II, at 1, col. 1; Crittenden Report, supra note 106, at 5.
182. See Gross, supra note 181, § II, at 1, col. 1; Rivera, supra note 25, at 323-24.
183. See Rich, 735 F.2d at 1227 n.7; PERSEREC Report, supra note 23, at 30-31. The
PERSEREC Report suggests that more studies are needed to test the military's hypothesis that
prejudicial reactions will cause "insurmountable problems." PERSEREC Report, supra note
23, at 39. Similar predictions about the negative impact of integrating African Americans and
including women proved untrue. Id. at 31, 35.
The PERSEREC Report was the result of a DoD request for a study on the security risks
associated with homosexual military personnel. See id. at 5. Finding that the security issue
was ultimately related to the broader question of suitability for service, the researchers pro-
duced a comprehensive report including "a historical review of the various social constructions
that have been placed on homosexuality, the effects of legal decisions and changing folkways,
and a summary of the scientific literature." Id. The DoD was dissatisfied with the PER-
SEREC Report's conclusions that homosexual persons were as suitable for service as hetero-
sexual persons and posed no greater security risks. GAYS IN UNIFORM xvi (K. Dyer ed. 1990).
Just as they had done earlier with the Crittenden Report, E. GIBSON, supra note 106, app. E,
at 366-67, Pentagon officials tried to suppress the PERSEREC Report, GAYS IN UNIFORM,
supra at xvi, and even attempted to hide it from a member of Congress. Id. at ix-x.
184. Watkins, 875 F.2d at 728-29 (Norris, J., concurring) (citing Army's Opening Brief
incorporating Navy's argument in Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788, 811 (9th Cir. 1980). It
is estimated that gays and lesbians constitute approximately ten percent of the armed forces;
yet, only a small percentage of that number are discharged for homosexuality. PERSEREC
Report, supra note 23, at 30.
For example, the following figures represent the Army's averaged discharge rates for ho-
mosexuality for 1985, 1986 and 1987:
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sumably would be unable to command effectively."' 5 Additionally, ho-
mosexuality might inspire "ridicule and notoriety," and thus damage
recruiting efforts.
186
With respect to its interest in preventing breaches of security, the
Army does not attempt to justify its claim that homosexual personnel are
an unacceptable security risk on the grounds of prejudice.'8 7 Instead, the
claim is that homosexual personnel are security risks because they are
vulnerable to blackmail.188 The only reason, however, that homosexual
servicepersons might be subject to blackmail on the basis of their homo-
sexuality is if they are forced to hide their sexual orientation because of
policies like the Army's-where openness leads to loss of employment. 89
Thus, the Army creates the potential for blackmail through its own regu-
lations and then justifies those same regulations by raising the specter of
blackmail.
This circular justification suggests that the assertion that gays and
lesbians are security risks, like the Army's other reasons for excluding
homosexual persons, is ultimately based on prejudice.190 In 1957, the
Crittenden Report found no evidence to support the theory that homo-
sexual individuals pose greater security risks than heterosexual individu-




Averaged Total Personnel for Homosexual Personnel
Enlisted men 597,791 0.05 %
Enlisted women 69,422 0.17 %
Male officers 98,233 0.004%
Female officers 11,220 0.007%
Id. app. B at 82, 84. Assuming that approximately ten percent of all military personnel are
homosexual, these discharge rate figures suggest that almost all homosexual personnel perform
their duties without incident. See id. at 29. Thus, the Army's fear that prejudicial reactions
will impair military performance seems to be unfounded.
185. Watkins, 875 F.2d at 728-29 (Norris, J., concurring) (citing Army's Opening Brief
incorporating Navy's argument in Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788, 811 (9th Cir. 1980)).
186. Id. at 729 (Norris, J., concurring) (citing Army's Opening Brief incorporating Navy's
argument in Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788, 811 (9th Cir. 1980)).
187. R. MOHR, GAYS/JusTICE 195 (1988).
188. Id. at 197.
189. Id. at 197-98.
190. Id. at 198-99.
191. Crittenden Report, supra note 106, at 12.
192. PERSEREC Report, supra note 23, at 35. But cf. High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus.
Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1990) (DoD's expanded security clearance checks
for gays and lesbians rational in light of proof that counterintelligence agencies target homo-
sexuals; whether counterintelligence agencies were motivated by ignorance or prejudice irrele-
vant to legitimacy of DoD's policy).
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:421
The Army's seldomly revealed reasons for barring homosexual indi-
viduals'93 show that acknowledgments of homosexual orientation are the
bases for exclusion because the Army fears homophobic'9 4 responses.
Such responses may occur when the individual's homosexual orientation
becomes known-that is, when this information is communicated to
others. 9 ' The Army automatically disqualifies a person who reveals his
or her homosexual status solely by speech, 196 yet, under certain circum-
stances, permits a person who disavows having a homosexual orientation
to serve despite evidence of actual homosexual conduct. 197 The language
of the Army regulations' 9 and the Army's rationale for promulgating
them' 99 thus both show that the Army's primary aim is to suppress a
particular message-admissions of homosexual orientation-not to pre-
vent homosexual conduct.
The Army's apprehension that a serviceperson's "coming out" state-
ment2 ° will elicit negative reactions in the listener is an insufficient rea-
son for suppressing speech.20 It is well established in the civilian
context 20 2 that the first amendment does not permit censorship of ideas
simply because the majority finds them offensive.203 Instead, the govern-
ment must control hostile audience reactions rather than punish the
speaker.
204
193. See supra notes 183-86 and accompanying text.
194. "Homophobia" connotes an "unreasoned resistance to learning about or interacting
with homosexuals" and, to a certain extent, shapes "the conventional attitude structure of
American males." PERSEREC Report, supra note 23, at 36.
195. See Watkins, 875 F.2d at 714 (Norris, J., concurring); Matthews, No. 82-0216 P, slip
op. at 33.
196. See supra note 72 for the texts of the relevant Army provisions.
197. See AR 140-111, table 4-2, rule E n.1. "[I]ndividuals who have been involved in ho-
mosexual acts in an apparently belated episode, stemming solely from immaturity, curiosity, or
intoxication, and absent other evidence that the individual is a homosexual, normally will not
be excluded from service." Id.
198. See supra note 72 for the text of the relevant Army provisions.
199. See supra notes 183-86 and accompanying text.
200. The term "coming out" refers to a homosexual individual's public acknowledgment of
his or her sexual orientation. Gay Law Students Ass'n v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 24 Cal. 3d
458, 488, 595 P.2d 592, 610, 156 Cal. Rptr. 14, 32-33 (1979).
201. See Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct., 2533, 2544 (1989); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321
(1988); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community
School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508-09 (1969).
202. See infra notes 258-306 and accompanying text for a discussion of how judicial defer-
ence to the military affects this analysis.
203. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2544; Boos, 485 U.S. at 321; Cohen, 403 U.S. at 25; Tinker, 393
U.S. at 508-09.
204. See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 550-51 (1965); Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315,
326-27 (1951) (Black, J., dissenting); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1949). Requir-
ing the Army to address the issue of hostile responses by heterosexual personnel would not
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The Army has attempted to justify catering to antihomosexual feel-
ings on the ground that such attitudes reflect traditional majoritarian val-
ues.205 Even though traditional beliefs and attitudes may validly inform
much governmental action,20 6 traditions founded upon prejudice are not
legitimate justifications.20 7 "Private biases may be outside the reach of
the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect."20 8
Even the most deferential standard of review requires assertion of a legit-
imate interest, whether in a civilian20 9 or military context.210 Thus, those
portions of the DoD directive and the Army's operational regulations
that exclude individuals "who by their statements demonstrate a propen-
sity to engage in homosexual conduct, ' 211 are unconstitutional because
they indirectly give effect to private bias.
212
Although the Ben-Shalom II panel briefly acknowledged that preju-
dice against homosexual persons might exist in the Army, it did not find
that this was the ultimate rationale for the Army's policy.213 Rather,
under the rubric of deference to military judgment, the panel accepted
the Army's purported interests 214 and, thus, avoided having to engage in
any meaningful inquiry.
create an undue burden on military resources. The Army already has educational mechanisms
in place for controlling racial prejudice. PERSEREC Report, supra note 23, at 31.
Homophobia could easily be addressed by these, or similar, programs. See id.
205. See Watkins, 875 F.2d at 729-30 (Norris, J., concurring). The Army's good faith in
making this assertion must be questioned. R. MOHR, supra note 187, at 192-96. The argu-
ments the Army now uses for excluding homosexual persons are the same arguments it used to
justify segregating African Americans and excluding women. Id. at 196; PERSEREC Report,
supra note 23, at 31, 35.
206. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 109 S. Ct. 2333, 2342 (1989) (rejecting adulterous natu-
ral father's asserted liberty interest in maintaining relationship with his child because relation-
ship not within traditional concept of "unitary family"); Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the
Constitution: A Note on the Relationship Between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U.
CHI. L. RaV. 1161, 1172-74 (1988).
207. See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984) (rejecting widely held racial prejudice
as justification for removing infant from interracial household); accord United States Dep't of
Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) ("[A] bare congressional desire to harm a politi-
cally unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest.").
208. Palmore, 466 U.S. at 433.
209. See Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1984) (rational basis pre-
supposes legislation is valid, but state must assert legitimate interest).
210. See Goldman, 475 U.S. at 506 (1986) (implying approval of need for" 'legitimate mili-
tary ends' ") (quoting Goldman v. Secretary of Defense, 734 F.2d 1531 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
211. 32 C.F.R. pt. 41 app. A, pt. l(H)(1); AR 135-178 10-2; see AR 140-111, table 4-2,
rule E. See supra note 72 for the text of the relevant provisions.
212. See Palmore, 466 U.S. at 433.
213. Ben-Shalom v. Marsh (Ben-Shalom II), 881 F.2d 454,461 (7th Cir. 1989), cert denied,
110 S. Ct. 1296 (1990).
214. See id. at 459-60.
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D. Strict Scrutiny of the Army's Antihomosexual Regulations
As the foregoing discussion reveals, the Army's enlistment and sepa-
ration regulations are concerned with communicative impact. Thus,
they are the kinds of restrictions that ordinarily require strict scrutiny.21 5
Even if the panel correctly concluded that the Army's interests were
legitimate, the challenged Reenlistment Regulation still would fail both
the "compelling interest" and "narrowly tailored" requirements of strict
scrutiny. The Army offered no proof that homophobic responses would
prevent formation of a unified force. No such facts were presented be-
cause the Army has never fully studied this issue.216 Strict scrutiny,
however, requires a factual showing of the compelling nature of the gov-
ernmental interest.21 7 The Army's interest in avoiding the negative im-
pact of private bias is based on speculation and, thus, is insufficient for
establishing that the restriction on speech is necessary.218
In addition, the regulation is not the least restrictive219 means for
serving the Army's asserted interest in preventing homosexual con-
duct. 2 ° The regulation disqualifies an individual on the basis of state-
ments acknowledging homosexual orientation regardless of whether the
speaker has ever engaged in any homosexual conduct.221 Given that ac-
knowledgments of homosexual orientation are neither admissions of con-
duct nor reliable indicators of probable conduct,222 the Army regulation
unduly burdens protected speech.223
Although it may discourage some homosexual conduct, the primary
215. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
216. See PERSEREC Report, supra note 23, at 31, 39 (suggestingfuture research examine
effects of nonconforming sexual orientations on group cohesion). The available research sug-
gests that homophobia is not an insurmountable problem. See id. at 31 (studies show job
performance of homosexual military personnel is satisfactory). The dynamics of prejudice are
similar whether the prejudice is racially motivated or based on homophobia. See id. at 24.
Thus, the history of racial integration in the military suggests that the Army has overpredicted
negative consequences from the presence of openly homosexual individuals. Id. at 31.
In addition, the experiences of the West German, Dutch and Israeli armed forces give
credence to the idea that openly homosexual individuals may be successfully integrated into
the military. R. MOHR, supra note 187, at 196. West Germany admits homosexual individu-
als in the noncommissioned ranks; The Netherlands includes homosexual personnel at all
levels; and Israel allows homosexual persons to fill noncombat posts. Id.
217. Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 227-28 (1984).
218. See id.
219. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 485 (1988) ("A statute is narrowly tailored if it
targets and eliminates no more than the exact source of the 'evil' it seeks to remedy.").
220. See Ben-Shalom 11, 881 F.2d at 460-61.
221. See supra note 72 for the text of relevant provisions.
222. See supra notes 105-16 and accompanying text.
223. See infra notes 231-57, 294-306 and accompanying text.
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effect of the Army's antihomosexual policy is to chill speech. A homo-
sexual soldier who remains silent can, if discrete, engage in a great deal of
sexual activity and remain in the Army.224 In contrast, a soldier who
announces his or her homosexual orientation, but who does not engage in
homosexual conduct, will be dismissed for merely having homosexual
desires.2 2  Thus, homosexual soldiers who are not anxious to lose their
jobs will probably choose to remain silent. Statistics on the number of
discharges for homosexuality compared with the probable number of ho-
mosexual Army personnel would seem to confirm this prospect.226
A less restrictive alternative for deterring homosexual conduct
would be a regulation which was limited to proscribing homosexual acts,
but not speech. Arguably, as long as Hardwick remains good law, such a
regulation would not abridge any constitutionally protected right.227 It
even would be permissible to restrict announcements of sexual orienta-
tion while on duty or while on military property.228 Such restrictions,
however, would be inappropriate if they drew distinctions on the basis of
the type of sexual orientation being announced.229
E. First Amendment Interests Implicated by Acknowledgments of
Homosexual Orientation
While strict scrutiny is the required standard of review for content-
based restrictions on speech in a civilian setting, it is a well-established
principle that governmental restrictions which would be invalid in a ci-
vilian context may be constitutional in a military environment due to the
special needs of the military.230 Before examining the impact of the mili-
tary context on the appropriate standard of review for the Army's Reen-
224. PERSEREC Report, supra note 23, at 29-30.
225. 32 C.F.R. pt. 41 app. A, pt. l(-)(1)(b)(1), (c); AR 135-178 10-4(a)(5); see Watkins
v. United States Army, 875 F.2d 699, 714 (9th Cir. 1989) (Norris, J., concurring), cert. denied,
IIl S. Ct. 384 (1990). See supra note 72 for the relevant text of these provisions.
226. See supra note 184 for statistics showing the Army's averaged discharge rates for ho-
mosexuality from 1985 through 1987.
227. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986). See supra notes 38-56 and accom-
panying text for a summary of views about Hardwick's impact beyond the area of substantive
due process. The issue of suspect or quasi-suspect classification for homosexual persons, who
are defined as such on the basis of their conduct, is beyond the scope of this Note.
228. See Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 839 (1976) (denying access of civilian political
speaker to military base, but recognizing military personnel had right "to attend political ral-
lies, out of uniform and off base.").
229. See id. at 828-29. See infra notes 307-36 and accompanying text.
230. See Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 758 (1974) ("The fundamental necessity for obedi-
ence, and the consequent necessity for imposition of discipline, may render permissible within
the military that which would be constitutionally impermissible outside it.").
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listment Regulation, however, it is essential to understand the nature of
the first amendment interests at stake.
1. Political speech
The Seventh Circuit in Ben-Shalom v. Marsh (Ben-Shalom//)231 ig-
nored the political character of statements acknowledging homosexual
orientation. As the California Supreme Court has observed, a homosex-
ual person's coming-out statement is not only an expression of sexual
preference, it is also an "aspect of the struggle for equal rights," particu-
larly in matters concerning employment.232 Commentators similarly
have noted that coming out is perhaps the most effective way of combat-
ting prejudice against homosexual persons.233 Coming- out statements by
military personnel are especially political in nature since the issue of
whether gays and lesbians should be allowed to serve is "a matter of
intense public debate.
'234
Acknowledgments of homosexual orientation are thus classic exam-
ples of political speech. Such speech merits the highest constitutional
protection231 given that one of the basic goals of the first amendment is to
231. 881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989), cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 1296 (1990).
232. Gay Law Students Ass'n v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 458, 488, 595 P.2d 592,
610, 156 Cal. Rptr. 14, 32-33 (1979); see Matthews v. Marsh, No. 82-0216 P, slip op. at 24 (D.
Me. Apr. 3, 1984), vacated, 755 F.2d 182 (1st Cir. 1985). Institutionalized homophobia has a
recognized political impact. See Rich, supra note 126, at 657; PERSEREC Report, supra note
23, at 36. With respect to men, it motivates those who are uncertain about their sexual orien-
tation to publicly condemn homosexuality in order to affirm their masculinity. PERSEREC
Report, supra note 23, at 36. This, in turn, perpetuates the ignorance which leads to prejudice
against homosexual persons. Id.
With respect to women, antilesbianism has a negative impact on the freedom and equality
of all women, regardless of their sexual orientation. Rich, supra note 126, at 657. Rich sug-
gests that heterosexuality is a political institution, as well as a sexual preference. Id. at 637.
Socially enforced compulsory heterosexuality (a separate phenomenon from freely chosen het-
erosexuality) is designed to ensure the privileged economic and cultural status of men in soci-
ety. Id. at 647. Lesbians, by their very existence, threaten institutionalized heterosexuality
because they evidence the deep connections women can form with each other. See id. at 648-
49.
Another commentator has noted that bisexuality represents a choice "to act against heter-
osexist cultural constraints." Shuster, Sexuality as a Continuum: The Bisexual Identity, in
LESBIAN PSYCHOLOGIES 56, 57 (Boston Lesbian Psychologies Collective ed. 1987). Some bi-
sexual women even call themselves "political lesbians." See Golden, supra note 111, at 30.
233. PERSEREC Report, supra note 23, at 36; R. MOHR, supra note 187, at 177; Halley,
supra note 47, at 970-73.
234. Matthews, No. 82-0216 P, slip op. at 24.
235. Various kinds of speech are perceived as lying on a continuum. See Virginia State Bd.
of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 n.24 (1976) (regu-
lation of commercial speech less likely to chill speech than regulation of other forms of speech
because profit motive spurs advertisers to take risks). Political speech occupies the high end of
the spectrum and merits the utmost protection, whereas indecent speech usually is on the low
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ensure democratic social and political change.2 36 Social visibility of gays
and lesbians helps reduce homophobia.237 Regulations that discourage
"coming out" statements violate the principle that content-based restric-
tions should not be used to avoid an "evil" when more speech could
effect a cure.238
Although the military may impose restrictions on political dis-
course, those restrictions are limited.239 The challenged Army regulation
results in total suppression of speech with a high political content and,
consequently, violates even the limited first amendment rights of Army
personnel.24°
2. Acknowledgments of homosexual orientation: freedom of thought
In addition to unduly burdening political speech, the Army's regula-
tions directly affect other first amendment rights which are related to, yet
distinguishable from, speech per se. Under the Army's definition, "[a]
homosexual is a person, regardless of sex, who engages in or desires to
engage in, or intends to engage in sexual acts with one's own sex."241
Thus, the Army's restriction applies to unconsummated "intent[s]" and
"desire[s]" and to unspoken thoughts, as well as outward expressions.
242
The Ben-Shalom II court concluded that admissions of homosexual
orientation were admissions of a desire to engage in homosexual acts, and
that the existence of the desire indicated a propensity to commit such
acts.243 Desires, however, are often unfulfilled, and the connection be-
tween desires and conduct can be quite weak. 2'
end of the continuum and deserves less protection. Compare Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15,
20-21 (1971) (jacket bearing phrase "Fuck the Draft" was form of political protest) with FCC
v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 746 (1978) (comedian's monologue entitled "Filthy Words"
was indecent speech with little political or social meaning).
236. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964).
237. PERSEREC Report, supra note 23, at 36; R. MOHR, supra note 187, at 177; Halley,
supra note 47, at 970-73.
238. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). One of the
primary justifications for strict scrutiny of content-based restrictions derives from the premise
that "debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open." Sullivan, 376
U.S. at 270.
239. See Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 355-56 (1980) (circulation of petitions); Greer v.
Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 839 (1976) (access of political speakers to military base); see infra notes
258-306 and accompanying text.
240. See infra notes 294-301 and accompanying text.
241. AR 135-178 10-3(a) (1989); see 32 C.F.R. pt. 41 app. A, pt. l(H)(1)(b)(1) (1989).
242. See Matthews, No. 82-0216 P, slip op. at 36-37.
243. Ben-Shalom 1I, 881 F.2d at 460.
244. Matthews, No. 82-0216 P, slip op. at 32. Furthermore, both heterosexual and homo-
sexual people are quite selective about their sexual partners and the time, place and manner of
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The first amendment protects thoughtza" and emotion 246 as well as
speech. Suppression of unvoiced desires and intents is an impermissible
intrusion on thought and emotion.247 As the Supreme Court has noted,
"Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving gov-
ernment the power to control men's minds. '248 Thus, to paraphrase Pro-
fessor Laurence Tribe, the question in Ben-Shalom II was not what
Miriam Ben-Shalom may have been doing in her mind, but rather, what
the United States Army was doing there.249
3. Privacy and personality
In benShalom v. Secretary of Army (Ben-Shalom /),250 the district
court recognized that sexual identity is a component of personality.
251
The district court noted that the first amendment, in particular, protects
manifestations of personality252 as a penumbral right.253 "One's person-
ality develops and is made manifest by speech [and] expression .... It is
only when one's personality, no matter how bizarre or potentially dan-
gerous, actually manifests itself in the form of unlawful conduct, that the
government may intercede in an effort to control the personality or re-
strict its manifestation. '2 54 Consequently, the district court concluded
that, in attempting to suppress Ben-Shalom's statements of self-identifi-
cation, the Army had abridged her first amendment right of privacy, as
expressing sexual behavior. PERSEREC Report, supra note 23, at 37. Consequently, it is
false to assume that a general "desire" will translate into conduct.
245. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565-66 (1969).
246. See Cohen, 403 U.S. at 26.
247. Matthews, No. 82-0216 P, slip op. at 39-40 ("[Tlhe existence and expression of
thought and emotion are critical First Amendment interests that... outweigh the military
interest in seeking to avoid negative reactions through the simple expedient of universally
prohibiting the existence or expression of unpalatable thoughts and emotions among
servicepersons.").
248. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 565 (overturning conviction of defendant charged with private
possession of obscene films seized in his bedroom because government has no "right to control
the moral content of a person's thoughts").
249. See L. TRIBE, supra note 8, § 15-21, at 1428.
250. 489 F. Supp. 964 (E.D. Wis. 1980), aff'd on other grounds, 826 F.2d 722 (7th Cir.
1987).
251. Id. at 975.
252. Id. (" '[A]utonomous control over the development and expression of one's intellect,
interests, tastes, and personality' are among the most precious of rights protected by the First
Amendment." (emphasis added) (quoting Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 211 (1973) (Douglas,
J., concurring))).
253. Id. "Penumbral rights" are privacy rights which emanate from the first, fourth, fifth
and ninth amendments, U.S. CONST. amends. I, IV, V, IX, and give these amendments "form
and substance." Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
254. Ben-Shalom I, 489 F. Supp. at 976.
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well as her right to speech.2"'
The Seventh Circuit panel did not examine this issue in Ben-Shalom
11.2"6 Although the Supreme Court has held that the fundamental right
of privacy does not extend to acts of homosexual sodomy,257 the first
amendment right of privacy relating to personality should still protect
expressions of homosexual identity.
F Deference to the Military
The doctrine of "military necessity" cautions judicial restraint par-
ticularly in reviewing professional military determinations regarding mil-
itary personnel.25 8 Nevertheless, the question remains as to the extent of
this judicial deference.259 In concluding that the Army's regulation did
not abridge any first amendment rights, the Ben-Shalom II panel relied
on two cases involving military restrictions on speech 21° that, upon close
examination, support different standards: Brown v. Glines2 61 and
Goldman v. Weinberger.2 62 Although the panel failed to recognize the
distinction between these cases, the Reenlistment Regulation at issue in
Ben-Shalom 11 fails under either standard.
1. The Glines test
The language of the Glines test is almost identical to that used in the
O'Brien test.263 Thus, Glines seems to endorse a relaxed level of scrutiny
appropriate to content-neutral restrictions. The Glines Court's analysis,
however, suggests that the Court actually applied a stricter standard of
review than the one it enunciated.
The issue in Glines was whether an airman could circulate a petition
255. Id
256. The district court in Ben-Shalom II also did not address the issue of manifestations of
personality, but the court did hold that Ben-Shalom's right to speech had been abridged. See
BenShalom v. Marsh, 703 F. Supp. 1372, 1377 (E.D. Wis.), rev'd, 881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1296 (1990).
257. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986).
258. See Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U. L. REv. 181, 183, 186-87
(1962).
259. See id. at 187-88.
260. Ben-Shalom v. Marsh (Ben-Shalom II), 881 F.2d 454, 459-62 (7th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 1296 (1990).
261. 444 U.S. 348 (1980).
262. 475 U.S. 503 (1985).
263. Compare Glines, 444 U.S. at 354-55 ("substantial Government interest unrelated to
the suppression of free expression ... restrict[ing] speech no more than is reasonably neces-
sary.") with United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968) ("substantial governmental
interest ... unrelated to the suppression of free expression [with] incidental restriction no
greater than is essential").
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on an Air Force base without the base commander's prior approval. 264
The Supreme Court noted that the challenged regulation only allowed
base commanders to bar distribution of materials posing a "clear danger
to military loyalty, discipline, or morale." 6 The Court also observed
that the regulation only applied to materials circulated on the military
base itself and that permission to circulate could not be denied to materi-
als that "merely criticize[d] the Government or its policies. ' '266 Conse-
quently, the Court held that the Air Force regulation did not violate the
first amendment.267
The Court's approval of the "clear danger" limitation in the regula-
tion suggests a fairly strict standard of review because the phrase "clear
and present danger" sometimes is used as a substitute for strict scru-
tiny.268 The Court's emphasis on the physically limited scope of the reg-
ulation in Glines also suggests that the Court would have favored a
stricter test if the restriction on speech had not been confined to military
property. Finally, the Court's approval of the exemption for materials
that "merely criticize[d] the Government" also indicates that the Court
was not rejecting strict scrutiny for content-based restrictions by the mili-
tary. Thus, contrary to the Ben-Shalom II court's assumption,269 Glines
does not stand for the proposition that all military restrictions of speech
need only pass a low-level reasonableness test.
2 70
264. Glines, 444 U.S. at 349. Glines arranged for the circulation of several petitions on the
United States Air Force base in Guam. Id. at 351. The petitions were addressed to the Secre-
tary of Defense, two United States Senators, and a Congressman, respectively, and requested
the recipients' assistance in revising Air Force grooming standards which the signators alleged
contributed to racial tensions. Id. at 351 n.3.
while holding that the Air Force regulation did not facially violate the first amendment,
the Court recognized that a soldier might raise a colorable claim of abridged first amendment
rights if a base commander withheld approval "irrationally, invidiously, or arbitrarily." Id. at
357 n.15. Glines, however, could not avail himself of this argument because he had never
submitted his petitions for approval. Id.
265. Id. at 355.
266. Id. at 355-56.
267. Id. at 358.
268. The United States Supreme Court has delineated several categories of speech which
fall outside the protection of the first amendment. L. TRIBE, supra note 8, § 12.2, at 791-92.
One of these categories is speech that creates a "clear and present danger." Schenck v. United
States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). As currently defined, speech presents a "clear and present
danger" when it advocates and is likely to produce immediate lawless action, Brandenburg v.
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,447 (1969), which is of a serious nature. Landmark Communications, Inc.
v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 842-45 (1978).
269. See Ben-Shalom II, 881 F.2d at 459-61.
270. See Miller v. Rumsfeld, 647 F.2d 80, 87 (9th Cir.) (Norris, J., dissenting) (objecting to
denial of rehearing en banc reasoning that Court in Glines applied close scrutiny, and thus
Glines could not support mere rational basis review of Navy regulation concerning discharge
of homosexual personnel), cert denied, 452 U.S. 905, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 855 (1981).
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Unlike the Air Force regulation in Glines, the Army regulation that
Ben-Shalom challenged does not contain language limiting the scope of
the restriction.271 Rather, the Army regulation facially restricts commu-
nication on an entire topic-self-acknowledgments of homosexual iden-
tity.2 72 Such regulations must be narrowly tailored so that "each activity
within the proscription's scope is an appropriately targeted evil."2 73
Nothing in Glines suggests a contrary conclusion simply because a mili-
tary authority, rather than a civilian one, has imposed the restriction on
protected speech.
2. The Goldman test
In contrast to its appraisal of the level of deference required under
Glines, the Ben-Shalom II panel correctly identified the standard used in
Goldman v. Weinberger2 74 as highly deferential. In Goldman, a sharply
divided Supreme Court275 upheld an Air Force regulation which pro-
vided that airmen, other than military police, could not wear headgear
indoors while on duty.276 Goldman, an Orthodox Jewish rabbi, chal-
lenged the regulation after his commanding officer had threatened him
with a court martial for violating the dress code by continuing to wear
his yarmulke.27 7 The majority accepted the Air Force's claim of military
necessity and held that there was a reasonable connection between the
dress code and the Air Force's asserted interests in discipline and
unity.278 In effect, the Court rejected a strict scrutiny test279 in favor of
271. Compare Glines, 444 U.S. at 349 n.1 (quoting Air Force regulation) with 32 C.F.R. pt.
41 app. A, pt. l(H) (1989) and AR 140-111, table 4-2, rule E (1989) and AR 135-178 110
(1989). See supra notes 35 and 72 for the text of the relevant Army provisions. Statements
acknowledging homosexual orientation are unlikely ever to come within the "clear and present
danger" category of unprotected speech unless the speaker urges the listener immediately to
commit sodomy, heterosexual or homosexual, and the listener is likely to comply immediately.
See supra note 268 for the elements of the "clear and present danger" test.
272. 32 C.F.R. pt. 41 app. A, pt. I(H)(1)(b)(1), (c).
273. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 485 (1988).
274. 475 U.S. 503 (1985).
275. Chief Justice Burger, and Justices White, Powell and Stevens joined in the majority
opinion delivered by Justice Rehnquist. Id. at 503. Justices Brennan, Blackmun and
O'Connor fied separate dissenting opinions. Id. at 513 (Brennan, J., dissenting), 524 (Black-
mun, J., dissenting), 528 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall joined in dissent with
Justices Brennan and O'Connor. Id. at 513 (Brennan, J., dissenting), 528 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
276. Id. at 505.
277. Id. at 505-06. A yarmulke is a skullcap worn by Orthodox Jewish men. WEBs=SR'S,
supra note 116, at 2647. Orthodox Jewish tradition requires males "to cover [their] head[s]
before an omnipresent God." Goldman, 475 U.S. at 513 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
278. Goldman, 475 U.S. at 507-10.
279. See id. at 528 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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what one dissenter called a "subrational-basis standard" of review.28 0
Even if it is assumed that the Court applied the proper standard of
review in Goldman, Ben-Shalom II warranted application of a stricter
standard for several reasons. First, although Goldman's right to observe
an important practice of his religion was seriously impaired, he still could
identify himself verbally as an Orthodox Jewish person and remain in the
Air Force.2"' He could also wear his yarmulke as long as he was off-duty
and not in uniform.28 2 Under the Army's regulation, however, Ben-Sha-
lom could not say she was a lesbian, or even harbor unspoken lesbian
desires, at anytime or anywhere, and still remain in the Army.283
Second, the Air Force regulation, while targeting conduct, did not
exclude Orthodox Jewish men for "having a propensity" to engage in the
prohibited activity of wearing headgear indoors.284 In contrast, the
Army's regulation focuses on the individual's status,2 5 and excludes
homosexually oriented soldiers merely for "having a propensity" to en-
gage in forbidden homosexual conduct. 28
6
Finally, even if one assumes that prohibiting airmen from wearing
yarmulkes indoors effectively excluded Orthodox Jewish men from serv-
ing in the Air Force,28 7 the regulation in Goldman differs from the one in
Ben-Shalom II in another respect. The Air Force regulation evenhand-
edly forbade visible variations of dress; 288 the prohibition was not in-
spired by animosity towards any particular religion.28 9 In contrast, the
Army's regulation suppresses communication of sexual orientation by
homosexual soldiers only; heterosexual soldiers are completely free to ac-
knowledge their sexual orientation.290 Yet, heterosexually oriented
280. Id. at 515 ("absolute, uncritical 'deference to the professional judgment of military
authorities.'" (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507
(1985) (majority opinion))).
281. See id. at 505.
282. Id.
283. See Ben-Shalom II, 881 F.2d at 462; 32 C.F.R. pt. 41 app. A, pt. l(H)(1)(b)(1).
284. Brief for American Civil Liberties Union Foundation and American Civil Liberties
Union of Wisconsin Foundation, Inc. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellee at 16, Ben-Shalom
v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989) (Nos. 88-2771 & 89-1213), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct.
1296.
285. See supra notes 193-99 and accompanying text.
286. Ben-Shalom II, 881 F.2d at 459.
287. See Goldman, 475 U.S. at 524 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe military services have
presented patriotic Orthodox Jews with a painful dilemma-the choice between fulfilling a
religious obligation and serving their country."). The distinction noted between Goldman and
Ben-Shalom II is still valid, however, since homosexually oriented soldiers are compelled to
leave the Army Reserves whereas Orthodox Jews may choose to remain in the military.
288. See Goldman, 475 U.S. at 510.
289. Id. at 513 (Stevens, J., concurring).
290. See supra note 72 for the text of AR 140-111 and its accompanying note.
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soldiers may also have a "propensity to engage" in illicit sexual con-
duct.291 Furthermore, the Army ultimately justifies its restriction on the
basis of the animosity that some soldiers and potential recruits may feel
toward homosexual soldiers and officers.2 92
3. Balance between the Army's and the individual's interests
Neither Glines nor Goldman support the panel's total deference in
Ben-Shalom II. As Justice Brennan observed in his dissent in Glines,
although judges lack military expertise, "it is equally true that judges,
not military officers, possess the competence and authority to interpret
and apply the First Amendment." '293
Coming-out statements and unspoken homosexual desires are forms
of highly-valued protected speech.2 94 Assuming that the military's rea-
sons for excluding homosexual individuals were legitimate, the military's
interest in maintaining a strong fighting force is also significant.295 Thus,
because both parties' interests are important, the determinative factor
should be the extent to which the Army burdens otherwise protected
rights.
296
The Army's regulation imposes a total ban on any coming-out state-
ments and even any unspoken homosexual desires, regardless of whether
the statements or desires were made or felt "preservice, prior service, or
[during] current service. ' 297 Furthermore, the regulation does not limit
291. Matthews v. Marsh, No. 82-0216 P, slip op. at 29 n.28 (D. Me. Apr. 3, 1984), vacated,
755 F.2d 182 (1st Cir. 1985). The record in Matthews revealed that the Army had no prohibi-
tions against unconsummated "desire[s]" and "intent[s]" with regard to any other proscribed
sexual acts, nor was expulsion mandatory for those who committed such acts. Id. For exam-
ple, drill sergeants who used their positions to procure sexual favors from soldiers of the oppo-
site sex were not discharged. Id.
292. Watkins v. United States Army, 875 F.2d 699, 728-29 (9th Cir. 1989) (Norris, J., con-
curring), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 384 (1990); Matthews, No. 82-0216 P, slip op. at 33. See
supra notes 183-86 and accompanying text.
293. Glines, 444 U.S. at 370 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
294. See supra notes 231-55 and accompanying text.
295. Matthews, No. 82-0216 P, slip op. at 34-35.
296. There are three factors courts will consider in determining the extent of the burden
placed on protected rights: (1) the nature of the speech, see supra note 235 (discussing levels of
protection given to kinds of speech); (2) the quantum of restriction, compare FCC v. Pacifica
Found., 438 U.S. 726, 749-50 (1978) (upholding ban on broadcasting indecent material par-
tially because ban was limited to hours when children might be listening) with Sable Commu-
nications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 109 S. Ct. 2829, 2837-29 (1989) (invalidating portion of statute
banning indecent dial-a-porn telephone messages in part because ban was total); and (3) the
nature of the penalty imposed for violations. Compare Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 16
(1971) (ordinance imposed criminal penalty) with Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 730 (FCC placed letter
concerning offending broadcast in radio station's file but imposed no sanctions).
297. 32 C.F.R. pt. 41 app. A, pt. I(M(1)(b)(1), (c).
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the ban to military property, hours of duty, or any other time or place
which might be relevant to the military's interests.298
This level of intrusion surpasses any other imposed by the mili-
tary.2 9 9 For example, no regulations exist which similarly penalize indi-
viduals who have either openly acknowledged or silently contemplated a
desire at some moment in their lives to commit other illegal acts." °
Even in the context of the military, case law offers no precedent in sup-
port of such a pervasive level of intrusion. 0 1
Finally, the Army's policy cannot survive the less stringent review
normally associated with facially content-neutral restrictions because the
penalty for acknowledging a homosexual orientation-loss of employ-
ment 302-- is severe.50 3 In fact, the regulation not only causes loss of im-
mediate employment, but it also burdens future employment
opportunities since many government jobs have veteran preference hiring
criteria. 3°
Thus, the military's exclusion of persons solely on the basis of their
homosexual orientation fails even the highly relaxed standard of review
under Goldman 305 not only because the regulation abridges highly-val-
ued first amendment rights, but also because it places a total burden on
the exercise of these valued rights.30 6
G. Equal Protection for Expressive Rights
The Seventh Circuit's equal protection analysis in Ben-Shalom v.
Marsh (Ben-Shalom i/),307 like its first amendment analysis, was based
on the conflation of status with conduct.308 The appellate panel reasoned
that laws that treat homosexual persons differently from heterosexual
persons do not merit heightened judicial scrutiny because homosexuals
are defined by behavior which can be criminalized-same-sex sodomy.
30 9
Thus, the panel applied the weakest standard of review, the rational basis
298. Matthews, No. 82-0216 P, slip op. at 38-40.
299. See id. at 38-39.
300. Id. at 39.
301. See id. at 38-39; see supra notes 263-92 and accompanying text.
302. See AR 140-111, table 4-2, rule E (homosexuality a nonwaivable disqualification). See
supra note 72 for the text of rule E.
303. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972).
304. See, eg., Attorney General of New York v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898 (1986).
305. See supra notes 278-80 and accompanying text.
306. Matthews, No. 82-0216 P, slip op. at 39-40; see also supra notes 220-26 and accompa-
nying text.
307. 881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1296 (1990).
308. See id. at 463-64.
309. Id. at 464-65 (citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)).
[Vol. 24:421
EQUATING SPEECH WITH CONDUCT
test.310 Under that standard, Ben-Shalom's lesbian status provided a ba-
sis for "reasonable inferences about her probable conduct in the past and
in the future. ' 31  Accordingly, the panel found that the Reenlistment
Regulation, which disqualifies homosexual persons on the basis of their
sexual orientation even in the absence of proof of homosexual conduct,
312
did not violate principles of equal protection.31 3
As previously mentioned, this Note does not discuss whether laws
singling out homosexual persons, as defined by conduct, merit the strict
scrutiny given to legislation based on suspect or quasi-suspect classifica-
tions.314 Rather, this Note is limited to discussing the issue of equal pro-
tection only from the standpoint of the discriminatory interference with
protected speech.
First amendment and equal protection interests are often inter-
twined, and constitutional analysis can proceed along either strand.1 5
The emphasis of each analysis, however, is somewhat different. The
usual first amendment analysis focuses on the level of impingement on
the individual's interest in free expression in relation to the governmental
interest served.316 In contrast, an equal protection analysis focuses on
the discriminatory nature of the interference31 7 with an individual's fun-
damental right to free speech. 1 '
The Ben-Shalom II court did not question whether the Reenlist-
ment Regulation raised equal protection concerns regarding the exercise
of the fundamental right of speech because the panel found that the regu-
lation presented only a "border-line" first amendment case and did not
impinge on any first amendment rights.319 The panel's first amendment
310. Id. at 464. See supra note 92 for a brief description of the rational basis test.
311. Ben-Shalom II, 881 F.2d at 464.
312. See supra note 72 for the text of AR 140-11, Table 4-2, rule E (1989).
313. Ben-Shalom II, 881 F.2d at 464.
314. See supra note 45 for a description of the factors relevent to classifying a group as
suspect or quasi-suspect. For a comprehensive analysis of why classifications based on homo-
sexuality should be considered suspect, like classifications based on race, alienage and national
origin, see Watkins v. United States Army, 875 F.2d 699 724-28 (9th Cir. 1989) (en bane)
(Norris, J., concurring), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 384 (1990).
315. Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 94-95 (1972).
316. See, eg., Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 109 S. Ct. 2829, 2836-39 (1989).
317. See, eg., Mosley, 408 U.S. at 100-02.
318. Fundamental rights are those which the United States Supreme Court has recognized
as forming "the matrix, the indispensable condition" of a free society. Palko v. Connecticut,
302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937). In defining such rights, the Court has relied heavily on The Bill of
Rights of the United States Constitution, Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148 (1968), and
has specifically recognized first amendment rights as "fundamental." E.g., Board of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
319. Ben-Shalom II, 881 F.2d at 462.
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analysis, however, was seriously flawed. The Army's regulation does in-
deed interfere with the fundamental right of speech.320 Moreover, the
interference is discriminatory and, thus, violates the basic premise of
equal protection that all similarly situated persons should be treated
alike.32 1 The challenged regulation allows heterosexual persons to talk
freely about their sexual orientation and to feel sexual desires, but penal-
izes homosexual persons for talking about their sexual orientation and
for feeling their sexual desires.322
Just as laws that burden speech on the basis of communicative im-
pact merit strict scrutiny,323 laws that interfere in a discriminatory man-
ner with the exercise of a fundamental right also requires strict
scrutiny.324 Therefore, from the standpoint of equal protection, AR 140-
111 violates the first amendment unless the restriction of expressive
rights serves a legitimate and compelling military interest 325 and the reg-
ulatory classification on the basis of homosexual orientation is neither
underinclusive 326 nor overinclusive. 327 Assuming that the Army's pur-
ported interests328 are legitimate and compelling,329 it is doubtful that a
regulation based on homosexual orientation, which bars individuals
solely bcause of their speech, demonstrates a sufficiently close means-end
fit. 330
The challenged regulation is simultaneously under- and overinclu-
sive, as can be seen when one examines the relationship between the de-
fining "trait," (T) homosexual orientation, and the "mischief" (M) it
320. See supra notes 294-305 and accompanying text.
321. F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
322. AR 140-111, table 4-2, rule E. See supra note 72 for the text of AR 140-111.
323. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
324. See Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
325. See supra notes 294-306 and accompanying text.
326. An "underinclusive" classification is one which does "not include all who are similarly
situated with respect to a rule, and thereby burden[s] less than would be logical to achieve the
intended government end." L. TRIBE, supra note 8, § 16-4, at 1447.
327. An "overinclusive" classification includes persons who are not similarly situated and
consequently imposes a greater burden than necessary to achieve the government's goal. See
id. at 1449-50. Courts tend not to invalidate a statute for being under-or overinclusive unless
the statute clearly manifests an abuse of power-the Constitution does not require "mathemat-
ical nicety." Id. at 1446. When, however, a fundamental right is infringed, courts require a
close means-ends fit between the regulation and the interest served, and unevenly imposed
burdens are suspect. See, eg., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (right to marry);
Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (freedom of speech).
328. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
329. See supra notes 179-214 and accompanying text for an analysis of the Army's interest
in excluding persons on the basis of their homosexual orientation alone.
330. See, e.g., Mosley, 408 U.S. at 101 ("interest in preventing disruption" insufficient to
justify "wholesale exclusion of picketing on all but one preferred subject.").
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allegedly targets, homosexual conduct.331 An arguably sizable percent-
age of persons having a homosexual orientation do not engage in homo-
sexual conduct.332 That is, some Ts are Ms; some Ts are not Ms.
333
Moreover, a fairly large percentage of persons engaging in homosexual
conduct do not have a homosexual orientation,334 or some Ms are not
Ts.335  Because the selected trait is not substantially related to the
targeted conduct, the regulation fails the narrowly-tailored requirement
of strict scrutiny in an equal protection context 336 and results in unjusti-
fied discriminatory interference with the ability of similarly situated per-
sons-those who do not engage in homosexual conduct-to exercise
their first amendent rights.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Seventh Circuit's conclusion in Ben-Shalom v. Marsh (Ben-Sha-
lom I1) 337-- that the Army may exclude homosexual persons on the basis
of their sexual orientation alone-rests on the theory that speech is con-
duct.338  This theory eviscerates the first amendment because it poten-
331. Joseph Tussman and Jacobus tenBroek, in discussing the theory of equal protection,
identified five possible relationships between persons as defined by the trait (7) and persons as
defined by the targeted mischief (M):
(1) All Ts are Ms, and all Ms are Ts
(2) No Ts are Ms
(3) All Ts are Ms but some Ms are not Ts
(4) All Ms are Ts but some Ts are not Ms
(5) Some Ts are Ms; some Ts are not Ms; and some Ms are not Ts
Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALUE. L. REv. 341, 347. The first
category represents a statute in which the classification is reasonably related to the asserted
goal. Id. at 348. The second category exemplifies an unreasonable classification because there
is no correlation between the classification and the interest served. Id. The third category
describes an underinclusive statute, id., the fourth category an overinclusive one, id. at 351,
and the fifth category reflects a statute which is both under- and overinclusive. Id. at 352.
332. For example, in one study of 199 gay men, 18% identified themselves as gay before
they had ever participated in homosexual acts. McDonald, supra note 114. For a discussion
of various studies of self-identified homosexual individuals which suggests that homosexual
self-identification may be unrelated to homosexual conduct, see supra notes 111-14 and accom-
panying text.
333. See Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 331, at 347.
334. In Kinsey's studies, 37% of the males and 13% of the females had engaged in homo-
sexual conduct leading to orgasm, and about half of the men and slightly over a quarter of the
women had experienced homosexual psychological responses. HUMAN FEMALE, supra note
108, at 474-75. Yet, only 1-3% of the females and 3-16% of the males were exclusively homo-
sexual. I. at 488.
335. See Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 331, at 347.
336. See Mosley, 408 U.S. at 101-02.
337. 881 F.2d 454 (7th cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1296 (1990).
338. See supra notes 147-75 and accompanying text.
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tially makes punishable as conduct all speech and thought that may refer
to disapproved behavior.
The primary constitutional defect of the Army's regulation is that it
was motivated by an illegitimate purpose: the avoidance of hostile lis-
tener response based on prejudice.339 The Army, as a government entity,
is proscribed from directly or indirectly encouraging private bias.3" Ex-
isting Army training programs which are designed to eliminate racial
prejudice can serve as models for dealing with homophobic reactions
among service personnel.34 Although the Army may have legitimate
authority to regulate homosexual conduct, 342 precedent does not support
the pervasive intrusion on highly-valued first amendment rights permit-
ted under the Army's separation and enlistment regulations. 343 The Sev-
enth Circuit also failed to recognize that the Army's regulation interferes
in a discriminatory manner with the exercise of the fundamental right of
speech.3' The trait of homosexual orientation, as revealed by speech, is
not sufficiently related to the targeted interest of preventing homosexual
conduct.3 45 Consequently, the substantial under- and overinclusiveness
of the regulation violates the principle of equal protection.3
46
Finally, in totally deferring to military necessity, the Seventh Circuit
abrogated its duty of constitutional review.347 The danger inherent in the
panel's assumption that the military is beyond the reach of the Constitu-
tion has already been demonstrated by subsequent courts' citations to
Ben-Shalom II, in a civilian context, for the proposition that classifica-
tions based on homosexual status do not violate equal protection if they
can pass a low-level rational basis test.348 When the judiciary unques-
tioningly bows to military necessity as a justification for laws that would
ordinarily be deemed unconstitutional, "The principle then lies about
like a loaded weapon ready for the hand of any authority that can bring
forward a plausible claim of an urgent need. '349
339. See supra notes 180-212 and accompanying text.
340. See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 385
(1967).
341. See PERSEREC Report, supra note 23, at 31.
342. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986); 10 U.S.C. §§ 880, 925(a), 933, 934
(1988).
343. See supra notes 293-306 and accompanying text.
344. See supra notes 307-36 and accompanying text.
345. See supra notes 331-36 and accompanying text.
346. See supra notes 325-36 and accompanying text.
347. See Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 349, 370 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
348. See High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 571 (9th
Cir. 1990); Doe v. Sparks, 733 F. Supp. 227, 231 (W.D. Pa. 1990).
349. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 246 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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Thus, Ben-Shalom 11 makes President Eisenhower's thirty-year-old
warning timely once again:
We must never let the weight of th[e military industrial
complex] endanger our liberties or democratic processes. We
should take nothing for granted. Only an alert and knowledge-
able citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the... ma-
chinery of defense with our peaceful methods and goals, so that
security and liberty may prosper together.3
Gisela Caldwell*
350. Warren, supra note 258, at 202-03 (quoting N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 1961, at 22, cols. 5,
6).
It seems particularly fitting to use a quote from President Eisenhower in support of the
rights of homosexual servicepersons in light of the following anecdote about Johnnie Phelps,
who served as a Women's Army Corps sergeant during World War II:
"IThere was a tolerance for lesbianism if they needed you. If you had a job to do
that was a specialist kind of job or if you were in a theatre of operations where bodies
were needed, then they tolerated anything, just about."
Sergeant Phelps had the opportunity to test this tolerance on one occasion when
General Eisenhower, her commanding officer, asked her to ferret out the lesbians in
her WAC battalion. She replied: "Sir, I'll be happy to do this investigation for you
but you'll have to know that the first name on the list will be mine... I think the
General should be aware that among those women are the most highly decorated
women in the war. There have been no cases of illegal pregnancies, there have been
no cases of AWOL, there have been no cases of misconduct, and as a matter of fact,
every six months the General has awarded us a commendation for meritorious ser-
vice."
Eisenhower, knowing better than to look a gift horse in the mouth, simply said,
"Forget the order."
A. WEISS & G. SCHILLER, BEFORE STONEWALL 34-35 (1988).
* The author wishes to thank Professor Christopher N. May, Susanne Peters and Anne
E. Caldwell, M.D. for their invaluable advice and unfailing support.
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